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THOMAS RUFFIN: OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY
AND MONUMENTS*
ALFRED L. BROPHY*
"Thomas Ruffin: Of Moral Philosophy and Monuments"
returns to Judge Thomas Ruffin's opinions, particularly on
slavery, to excavate his jurisprudence and to try to assess what
Ruffin's legacy means for us today. It begins with an exploration
of Ruffin's 1830 opinion in State v. Mann where he self-
consciously separated his feelings from his legal opinion to
release a man who abused a slave from criminal liability.
Antislavery activists frequently wrote about Mann, because of its
brutal honesty about the harsh nature of slavery. After
discussing Harriet Beecher Stowe's fictional account of Ruffin
and State v. Mann in Dred: A Tale of the Great Dismal
Swamp, which further developed the theme of separation of law
and morals, the paper turns to some of Ruffin's other opinions.
It looks to slavery opinions including Heathcock v. Pennington,
which released a renter of a slave from liability for the boy's
death in a coal mine, and Green v. Lane, which dealt with a trust
to give "quasi-freedom" to slaves, as well as nonslavery cases like
Scroggins v. Scroggins, which argued against granting judicial
divorces because that would encourage more of them.
Ruffin's jurisprudence took the world as it was, or as he phrased
it, looked to the "nature of things." His judicial opinions-the
monuments he left to us-illustrate a world of proslavery moral
philosophy. That thought separated humanity from law and then
decided cases based on precedent and considerations of utility to
society. Ruffin was a great expositor of the system of slavery, as
well as a great wielder of what Harriet Beecher Stowe referred to
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as the "cool, logical, and practical" reasons of the Anglo-Saxon
race.
What should we make of this legacy today? Perhaps Ruffin
aided the cause of antislavery through his honesty in State v.
Mann. And, thus, perhaps we should honor him for that.
Moreover, perhaps the honor he received in the early twentieth
century (when a dormitory was named in part for him on the
University of North Carolina campus) derives from his facility
with legal reasoning outside of the slavery context. However,
honoring him also runs the risk of honoring proslavery values.
Conversely, removing his name from a building now runs the
risk of concealing the prevalence of proslavery thought in the
nineteenth century. That is, removing a name might facilitate a
process of forgetting when universities should be trying to
provide a proper context for viewing our past.
INTROD U CTIO N ....................................................................................... 800
I. STABILITY AND ANTEBELLUM JURISPRUDENCE .................... 811
II. RUFFIN'S SLAVERY JURISPRUDENCE ....................................... 813
III. EM ANCIPATION CASES ................................................................ 818
IV. RUFFIN'S JURISPRUDENCE MORE GENERALLY ...................... 828
V. JUDICIAL OPINIONS AS MONUMENTS ....................................... 841
C O N CLU SIO N ........................................................................................... 854
INTRODUCTION
Judge Thomas Ruffin's contemporaries realized that they could
not judge his work fully. In 1851, John Hill Wheeler wrote, in a brief
biographical sketch of the judge, "[l]ike the Colossus of Rhodes, living
characters are best viewed in the distance."' Wheeler feared that he
was too close to take a full measure of the judge.
We must not be too near the massy statue to admire its
symmetrical proportions. When death and time have softened
down by their mellow hand any shadow that may in life obscure
our vision, and hallowed their services, talents, and virtues, then
may their biographies, with their epitaphs, be written.2
In his time, Ruffin was revered by many and reviled by many others.
Wheeler's statement about the need for distance is particularly apt
1. JOHN HILL WHEELER, HISTORICAL SKETCHES OF NORTH CAROLINA 20
(Philadelphia, Lippincott, Grambo & Co. 1851).
2. Id.
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here. For perhaps it is only now, 150 years later, that we can see Judge
Ruffin's full silhouette on the landscape.
Chief Justice Thomas Ruffin, now remembered on the
University of North Carolina campus for a dormitory named after
him and his son, was famous in his time for his 1830 opinion in State v.
Mann.3 Mann addressed a criminal prosecution of a man who shot a
slave, Lydia, who was in his possession (that is, he had rented her).'
Mann was successfully prosecuted at trial, but on appeal the court
concluded that he was not liable for the abuse.' The opinion began
with a reflection on the "struggle ... in the Judge's own breast
between the feelings of the man and the duty of the magistrate is a
severe one."6 Ruffin, though, separated his feelings from the law; that
theme runs throughout Ruffin's opinions. Indeed, that makes Ruffin
representative of nineteenth century jurists.7
The decision in State v. Mann is brief but revealing. Ruffin
recognized the question at the center of the case: can the state limit
the owner's power over slaves?8 Ruffin rejected analogies to the
relationship of parents and children.9 For slavery sought profit for the
master, as well as "security and the public safety." I Slaves were
"doomed" to never be able to own anything of value; they had to
work for others. The slave, to be an effective slave, must give up her
will to her owner. "The power of the master must be absolute to
render the submission of the slave perfect."11 That absolute power
resulted from the master's "uncontrolled authority over the body.""
Ruffin understood and was willing to discuss in his opinion the
conflicted moral world of slavery and freedom. That honesty and
insight are rare in antebellum jurisprudence. Ruffin concluded:
We cannot allow the right of the master to be brought into
discussion in the courts of justice. The slave, to remain a slave,
must be made sensible that there is no appeal from his master;
3. 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263 (1829).
4. Id. at 263.
5. Id. at 268.
6. Id. at 264.
7. TIMOTHY S. HUEBNER, THE SOUTHERN JUDICIAL TRADITION: STATE JUDGES
AND SECTIONAL DISTINCTIVENESS, 1790-1890, at 130-59 (1999).
8. See infra notes 11-13, 108-15.
9. See, e.g., infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
10. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) at 266.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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that his power is in no instance usurped; but is conferred by the
laws of man at least, if not by the law of God. 3
State v. Mann became, rather rapidly, a famous opinion-famous for
its honesty.
14
Harriett Beecher Stowe, using Mann as evidence of the
mechanism behind the slave code in 1853 in A Key to Uncle Tom's
Cabin,5 said the opinion cut to the heart of slavery. For it
demonstrated that the slave code was about protecting the property
rights of owners, not the slaves. 6 Stowe believed that no one could
"read this decision, so fine and clear in expression, so dignified and
solemn in its earnestness, and so dreadful in its results, without
feeling at once deep respect for the man and horror for the system.'
17
Stowe detected in the opinion "the conflict between the feelings
of the humane judge and the logical necessity of a strict interpreter of
slave-law."' 8 One commentator on Uncle Tom's Cabin9 recognized
that a master might protest "against slavery during that innocent part
of life when his soul belongs to God alone."2  But later, "when
society takes him, the law chases away God, and interest deposes
conscience."21 Stowe was particularly concerned with discovering
why sentiments failed to overcome reason-for she had written Uncle
Tom's Cabin with the idea that the propriety of the Fugitive Slave
Act of 1850 "could never be open for discussion" if Americans only
knew "what slavery [was]."22
13. Id. at 267.
14. The New Berne Register reprinted the opinion in its entirety shortly after it was
issued (and then that was reprinted in the Carolina Observer on June 24, 1830), with the
observation:
having ourselves been struck no less with the novelty of the discussion, than with
the forcible views of the case taken by the Judge, and the beauty and fitness in
which they are clothed, we have thought we could not, at this time, render a more
acceptable service to our professional readers at home and abroad, than to rescue
it from a mass of reports seldom read by general readers.
CAROLINA OBSERVER (Fayetteville, N.C.), June 24, 1830 (reprinting undated article from
NEW BERNE REG.).
15. HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, A KEY TO UNCLE TOM'S CABIN (Boston, Jewett,
Proctor & Worthington 1853).
16. Id. at 78-79.
17. Id. at 78.
18. Id. at 77.
19. HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, UNCLE TOM'S CABIN; OR, LIFE AMONG THE
LOWLY (Boston, John P. Jewett 1852).
20. Id. at xxxi.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 493.
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She held out hope that Ruffin might modify the law-that he
might "begin to listen to the voice of [his] more honorable nature,
and ... soften [the slave-code's] necessary severities. '23 He didn't.
Ruffin's unfailing separation of his legal mind from his feelings led
Stowe to conclude: "There is but one sole regret; and that is that such
a man, with such a mind, should have been merely an expositor, and
not a reformer of law.",
24
Ruffin policed the boundary between cold legal logic and the
warm sentiments of the heart, which might have yielded a more
humane result for the slaves. Stowe knew this to be true:
In the perpetual reaction of that awful force of human passion
and human will, which necessarily meets the compressive power
of slavery,-in that seething, boiling tide, never wholly
repressed, which rolls its volcanic stream underneath the whole
frame-work of society so constituted, ready to find vent at the
least rent or fissure or unguarded aperture,-there is a constant
necessity which urges to severity of law and inflexibility of
execution.25
Like others, Stowe respected Ruffin's mind:
He has, too, that noble scorn of dissimulation, that
straightforward determination not to call a bad thing by a good
name, even when most popular and reputable and legal, which
it is to be wished could be more frequently seen, both in our
Northern and Southern States. 6
Readers who wondered with Stowe how "such a man, with such a
mind," could have issued such a ruling received their answer in her
1856 novel, Dred: A Tale of the Great Dismal Swamp.27 In Dred,
Stowe created a fictional judge who issues a decision closely based on
State v. Mann.2' The fictional Judge Clayton of the North Carolina
Supreme Court did not want to issue the decision. Yet, he felt
compelled to do so because it was his legal duty. 29 Thus, Stowe set up
a conflict between cold legal logic and the warm sentiments of the
23. STOWE, supra note 15, at 71.
24. Id. at 79.
25. Id. at 71.
26. Id. at 78-79.
27. 1-2 HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, DRED: A TALE OF THE GREAT DISMAL
SWAMP (Boston, Phillips, Sampson and Co. 1856).
28. Id. at 40-42.
29. Id.
2009]
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heart. It was part of her religiously inspired critique of law, which
expanded on her critique in Uncle Tom's Cabin.3"
The lawsuit-this time a civil suit rather than a criminal
prosecution-was instigated by the slave owner Nina Gordon, who
was horrified by the treatment of Milly and sued to recover for Milly's
injuries.31 Edward Clayton, the son of Judge Clayton and a young
and idealistic lawyer, argued the case for Nina. "Reading the theory
is always magnificent and grand," Edward recalled." He quoted
Richard Hooker's aphorism that "'Law hath her seat in the bosom of
God; her voice is the harmony of the world."'33 But in discussion with
a friend, lawyer Frank Russell, Edward Clayton worried what
practice would do to his conscience. "Does not an advocate commit
himself to one-sided views of his subject, and habitually ignore all the
truth on the other side," the young lawyer asked.34
The influence of Edward's conscience on his legal training was
particularly evident when Stowe contrasted him with his father.
Edward "was ideal to an excess; ideality colored every faculty of his
mind, and swayed all his reasonings, as an unseen magnet will swerve
the needle. Ideality pervaded his conscientiousness, urging him
always to rise above the commonly received and so-called practical in
morals."35 While Edward relished the "the theory of law," he failed
in the application of legal principles.36 Edward's father was "obliged
constantly to point out deficiencies in reasonings, founded more on a
keen appreciation of what things ought to be, than on a practical
30. For further discussion of Stowe's views on the law as expressed in Dred, see
generally Alfred L. Brophy, Harriet Beecher Stowe's Interpretation of the Slavery of
Politics in Dred: A Tale of the Great Dismal Swamp, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 63,
(2000); Alfred L. Brophy, Humanity, Utility, and Logic in Southern Legal Thoughts:
Harriet Beecher Stowe's Vision in Dred: A Tale of the Great Dismal Swamp, 78 B.U. L.
REV. 1113 (1998).
31. Ruffin left open the question of Mann's civil liability, which is where Stowe's
Judge Clayton picked up. Nevertheless, by the time Stowe wrote Dred, Ruffin had
already held, in Jones v. Glass, 35 N.C. (13 Ired.) 305, 308-09 (1852), that a renter's severe
abuse of a slave in his custody would lead to civil liability. Id. at 306. In that case, the
majority spoke of Massey, the overseer in charge of the slave Willie, as the "judge, and, at
the time, the sole judge" of Willie. Id. at 307. It is testimony to the ways that North
Carolina law relegated control over slaves to individuals that the court spoke of overseers
as "judges." Id. And perhaps this says something about the adjudication of property
rights between white property owners.
32. 1 STOWE, supra note 27, at 21.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 31.
36. Id.
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regard to what they are."3 Because of the differences in conscience,
Edward and Judge Clayton "could never move harmoniously in the
same practical orbit."38
Judge Clayton, constructed by Stowe, as she tells us according to
artistic fit, reveals why Ruffin was merely an expositor.39 Peer behind
Judge Clayton's mask and listen to a conversation he has with his wife
regarding Milly's case. In response to his wife's question concerning
whether he must decide against Milly, the judge responds:
Yes, I must .... A Judge can only perceive and declare. What
I see, I must speak, though it go against all my feelings and all
my sense of right .... I sit in my seat, not to make laws, nor to
alter them, but simply to declare what they are. However bad
the principle declared, it is not so bad as the proclamation of a
falsehood would be.4°
Stowe was perceptive in her interpretation of Ruffin, for Judge
Clayton represented what Stowe and other abolitionists had come to
despise: an unflinching support of law over humanity, an ideology
that had taken strong hold in the antebellum judicial culture.
Judge Clayton emphasizes duty in a discussion he has with his
son Edward after the verdict. 4' The judge admits that he had thought
about retreating from slave society when he was young, but he
rejected that path. The reason he offers for supporting the law is the
security it provides to North Carolina society. "Human law is, at best,
but an approximation, a reflection of many of the ills of our nature.
Imperfect as it is, it is, on the whole, a blessing. The worst system is
better than anarchy. '42 Here Stowe identifies Judge Clayton with the
antebellum moral philosophers who emphasized the need for order in
society. He defends what we have come to call formalism-and
Stowe allows him to make the classic defense of legal formalism-that
one must support law, no matter how unjust the results in individual
cases appear, in order to avoid anarchy. Judge Ruffin and the
fictional Judge Clayton spoke of the imperative duty that law
imposed upon them, and after doing so for a time, it became
impossible for them to adopt any other mode of reasoning.43
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at iv.
40. 2 STOWE, supra note 27, at 99-100.
41. Id. at 108-10.
42. Id. at 109.
43. See id. at 108-10 (illustrating this mode of reasoning through Judge Clayton's
musings).
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Towards the end of the conversation, Edward asks the same
question that Stowe asked about Judge Ruffin in A Key to Uncle
Tom's Cabin: "[M]y father, why could you not have been a reformer
of the system?"" Stowe's answer maps in wonderful detail why the
judges could not break out of their logical, formalistic reasoning.
Judge Clayton could not do so because of his abstract duty to the law,
symbolized by his oath to protect the Constitution, because of his
belief that society was actually better off with the decision he
rendered than by doing individual justice to individual slaves, and
because no piecemeal reforms would work.45 Moreover, Judge
Clayton believed he was not "gifted with the talents of a reformer.,
46
He was not gifted with those talents because he thought in legal
terms, which recognized only analytical reasoning, not humanity.
Another character in Dred, a lawyer named Mr. Jekyl, was the
vehicle for putting a family back into slavery after the will of their
husband and father, who was their owner, said they should be free.47
Jekyl poses a different set of questions from Judge Clayton, for we
might expect lawyers to be advocates of their causes. 48 However, the
juxtaposition with antislavery Edward Clayton suggests the ways that
proslavery advocacy bends a person's judgment and highlights the
power of considerations of expediency over humanity.49 For the
lawyer Edward Clayton sees law as a way of bringing about justice.
Yet, Edward also realizes the limits of law and, thus, at the end of the
novel Edward resigns from the practice of law and moves to Canada
with Cora and Cora's slaves, whom she had freed. ° Jekyl also points
out the ways that Stowe believed law served the interests of the slave
owner; as a lawyer he did the bidding of slave owners.51 Jekyl even
seemed to believe that what he was doing was right. Dred, thus,
44. Id. at 109.
45. Id. at 109-10.
46. Id. at 110.
47. Id. at 139-42.
48. Id.
49. See generally Norman Spaulding, The Myth of Civic Republicanism: Interrogating
the Ideology of Antebellum Legal Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1397 (2003) (identifying
zealous advocacy as a key theme in antebellum legal ethics). Stowe's Jekyl fits well into
the zealous advocacy picture. I would modify this theme somewhat and suggest that
lawyers were seen as stabilizers of the community and by supporting zealously the rights
recognized by the status quo (usually the rights of property owners) they helped to
prevent radical change. See generally DANIEL LORD, ON THE EXTRA-PROFESSIONAL
INFLUENCE OF THE PULPIT AND THE BAR: AN ORATION DELIVERED AT NEW HAVEN,
BEFORE THE PHI BETA KAPPA SOCIETY OF YALE COLLEGE (New York, S.S. Chatterton
1851).
50. 2 STOWE, supra note 27, at 330-31.
51. Id. at 139-42, 202-05.
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expanded on a theme of one of Stowe's first short stories, entitled
Love Versus Law, which explored a property dispute between
neighbors. 2  The dispute was settled through love, rather than
through a lawsuit. 3 Stowe's literature expressed an opposition to
lawsuits, law, lawyers and legal reasoning, all of which she felt
obstructed humane sentiments.
Dred was an important precursor to post-war critiques of legal
formalism and a precursor to Herman Melville's Billy Budd as well. 4
For Stowe explored in detail what kind of person would issue a
proslavery decision even though he knew and felt that it was
inhuman. What kind of person would do that? A person upon whom
legal reasoning had left such deep ruts that he could no longer tap the
warm sentiments of the heart.5
Stowe followed other abolitionists who used Mann to point out
the conflict between humane sentiments and cold legal logic. State v.
Mann was a useful-perhaps even critical-piece of evidence about
the nature of proslavery legal thought. Indeed, abolitionists used
State v. Mann as a centerpiece of their attack on slavery and the law.
Many abolitionists attacked the law of slavery as well as the
institution: "Such is American Slavery, not as abused by the cruel
and the lawless, but as established by legislative enactments and
maintained by judicial decisions," wrote Samuel Wilberforce in
1846.56 William Goodell wrote in American Slave Code in Theory and
Practice57 that State v. Mann illustrated the complete removal of
52. HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, Love Versus Law, in THE MAYFLOWER OR,
SKETCHES OF SCENES AND CHARACTERS AND THE DESCENDANTS OF THE PILGRIMS 19
(New York, Harper & Brothers 1843).
53. Id. at 76.
54. See generally HERMAN MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD (Raymond W. Weaver ed.,
1924).
55. Stowe also critiqued religious formalism in the novel. The character Reverend
Packthread, like Judge Clayton, refused to take action against slavery within the church,
citing his lack of power to change opinion. See 2 STOWE, supra note 27, at 196-97. The
relationship between post-war formalism and pro and antislavery thought is, to say the
least, complex. But perhaps it is more related to reaction against instrumentalism and a
retreat from the fanaticism that brought the nation to Civil War. At least we seem to
think that such a reaction explains much of the post-war formalism and retreat from issues
of politics, towards business. See generally DANIEL AARON, THE UNWRITTEN WAR:
AMERICAN WRITERS AND THE CIVIL WAR (1973); DAVID W. BLIGHT, RACE AND
REUNION (2001) (tracing the origins of post-war formalism in literature).
56. SAMUEL WILBERFORCE, A REPROOF OF THE AMERICAN CHURCH 17 (New
York, W. Harned 1846).
57. WILLIAM GOODELL, AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
(New York, American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society 1853) [hereinafter SLAVE
CODE].
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liability of slave owners for the abuse of enslaved people.5 8 Goodell's
volume was an important precursor to post-war realism in
jurisprudence. It utilized case reports as a rich source of data on the
legal system's relationship with slavery and pioneered the exploration
of the effect of legal rules on society.
Abolitionists used State v. Mann profitably as evidence of
slavery's inhumanity. Charles Elliott's Sinfulness of American
Slavery: Proved from Its Evil Sources,59 quoted extensively from
Mann to support the statement that "[n]one who are duly enlightened
on slavery will ever contend, except sophistically, that the relation of
parent and child, of husband and wife, of master and servant, are the
same with, or even similar to, the relation between the master and
slave. This is put beyond all doubt, by Judge Ruffin .... "60 Edward
Beecher, Harriet Beecher Stowe's brother, invoked Mann before the
Massachusetts Abolition Society to show that "the master must have
unlimited control over the body of his slaves, OR THE SYSTEM CANNOT
STAND":61
According to the decision, then, of a southern judge, extorted
from him by the inexorable necessity of his legal logic, in
opposition to his humane feelings, the relation of slavery, as
constituted by law, is, in itself, cruel, authorizing the unlimited
control of the master over the body of his slave, life not
excepted. Why? Because without such control, the system
could not stand; i. e. [sic] the relation could not exist, as it is
now legally constituted. No sin in such a relation? Then there
is no sin, a Carolina jurist being judge, for doing whatever is
58. Id. at 169-75. Goodell observed about State v. Mann:
Here is a document that will repay profound study. The moral wrong of slavery is
distinctly and repeatedly admitted, along with the most resolute determination to
support it, by not allowing the rights of the master to come under judicial
investigation, betraying a consciousness that they would not abide the test of the
first principles of legal science. The struggle between the man and the magistrate,
implying that slavery requires of its magistrates to trample upon their own
manhood; the cool and deliberate decision to do this, and to elevate the law of
slavery above the law of nature and of nature's God, are painful but instructive
features of the exhibition.
Id. at 174-75.
59. 1 CHARLES ELLIOTT, SINFULNESS OF AMERICAN SLAVERY: PROVED FROM ITS
EVIL SOURCES (Cincinnati, L. Swormstedt & J.H. Power 1850).
60. Id. at 296-97; see also Authority of Masters over Slaves, VT. CHRON., Apr. 16,
1845, at 62 (citing Judge Ruffin's rejection of the analogy that slaves are to masters as
children are to parents).
61. N. L. Rice, Mr. Rice's Fifth Speech (Oct. 1845), in A DEBATE ON SLAVERY 124,
134 (Cincinnati, Wm. H. Moore & Co. 1846).
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necessary (be it stripes, torture, or death,) to preserve this
sinless, lawful relation!62
The fact that Mann was one of Ruffin's first opinions as a justice
may account for his honesty. At least some of Ruffin's defenders
thought so. After defending Ruffin's opinion and pointing out the
limitations the law placed on owners, Edward Josiah Stearns
commented, "In justice to the Judge, I should state that this opinion
was delivered more than twenty-three years ago, and was among the
first, perhaps the very first, delivered by him on the bench of the
Supreme Court.,
63
After State v. Mann, Ruffin wrote of slavery in more than 425
cases involving such issues as criminal prosecutions of slaves,
emancipation, slaves as workers, rights among owners and renters,
and sale and demise of slaves.' He also wrote about nuisance,
62. Id.
63. See E. J. STEARNS, NOTES ON UNCLE TOM'S CABIN: BEING A LOGICAL ANSWER
TO ITS ALLEGATIONS AND INFERENCES AGAINST SLAVERY AS AN INSTITUTION 194
(Philadelphia, Lippincott, Granbo & Co. 1853). Only five opinions by Ruffin appeared in
the North Carolina Reports before Mann, and although they dealt with narrow, technical
issues, he had already expressed skepticism about reform-even modest reform of
property law- in one of them. Cf Morrison v. Connelly, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 233, 238 (1829)
(doubting whether the remedy imposed was harsh, but noting that the legislature may
change the law).
In the case after Mann, Ruffin justified (perhaps gratuitously) the legislative
policy of excluding illegitimate children from inheritance through their mothers if there
were any legitimate children. Flintham v. Holder, 16 N.C. (1 Dev. Eq.) 345,347-48 (1829).
Flintham permitted legitimate children of the decedent's mother to inherit, even though
the illegitimate child could not inherit through those children. Id. at 348. The answer
turned on the interpretation of a 1799 statute; however, Ruffin dealt with the spirit of the
act, which was to encourage marriage. Id.
64. For biographical sketches of Ruffin, see HUEBNER, supra note 7, at 130-59 (1999).
See generally MARK TUSHNET, SLAVE LAW IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH: STATE V. MANN
IN HISTORY AND LITERATURE (2003) (discussing Ruffin's view of the "logic of slavery");
Amy Dru Stanley, Dominion and Dependence in the Law of Freedom and Slavery, 28 LAW
& SOC. INQUIRY 1127 (2003) (contrasting Ruffin with another prominent contemporary-
Lemuel Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court). Both Shaw and Ruffin were
representative of a conservative legal order that was in transition towards a vigorous
support of capitalism-or at least was supportive of capitalism (it may have been
supportive of it for a long time). See generally A.W. Brian Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis
and the History of Contracts, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1979) (arguing that the common law
of contracts had supported the market for generations before Horwitz's identification of
changes in antebellum contracts law). Robert Cover has also dealt with those two judges,
for Shaw-like Ruffin-dealt with the conflict between law and morality at the center of
State v. Mann in Thomas Simms' case (and in the earlier, though somewhat morally less
difficult case of Commonwealth v. Ames, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193 (1836)). See ROBERT M.
COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 77 n.* (1975);
Alfred Konefsky, The Accidental Legal Historian: Herman Melville and the History of
American Law, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1179, 1222, 1270, 1272-76 (2004). See generally Brook
810 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87
evidence, and about torts, like the fellow servant rule. Where many
see American jurisprudence beginning in the years after the Civil
War,65 slavery generated a rich antebellum debate over the
relationship of legal rules to culture and vice versa. We are only now
beginning to explore that literature in depth, which includes novels,
debates in Congress, judicial opinions, and speeches to literary
societies, as well as more traditional sources, like treatises. Both sides
of the debate-antislavery and proslavery-realized the multiple
Thomas, The Legal Fictions of Herman Melville and Lemuel Shaw, 11 CRITICAL INQUIRY
24 (1984) (using critical legal studies to analyze "Melville's relationship with his father-in-
law, Lemuel Shaw").
Ruffin correlates highly with the picture presented by Morton Horwitz of a
judiciary that employed precedent to maintain vested rights, and also remade it to
promote economic growth. MARTIN HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1780-1860, at 24-28, 63-108 (1977); cf CHARLES SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION:
JACKSONIAN AMERICAN 1815-1846, at 396-97 (1991) (noting the contradiction between
liberty and slavery in the antebellum capitalist economy). See generally RUSH WELTER,
THE MIND OF AMERICA 1820-1860 (1975) (studying the social and political attitudes of
the Americans and the formation of a national character). We can see the great conflict
between conservation and innovation so central to the South as well as to law in this
period.
For more commentary on Ruffin, see JAMES OAKES, SLAVERY AND FREEDOM
160-62 (1990); Laura F. Edwards, "The Marriage Covenant Is at the Foundation of All Our
Rights": The Politics of Slave Marriages in North Carolina After Emancipation, 14 LAW &
HIST. REV. 81, 85 n.5 (1996); Stanley N. Katz, Opening Address, 17 CARDOZO L. REV.
1689, 1690, 1692-93 (1996); Walter F. Pratt, The Struggle for Judicial Independence in
Antebellum North Carolina: The Story of Two Judges, 4 LAW & HIST. REV. 129, 129,143-
44, 148-59 (1986); Reuel E. Schiller, Conflicting Obligations: Slave Law and the Late
Antebellum North Carolina Supreme Court, 78 VA. L. REV. 1207, 1237-41 (1992); Alan
Watson, Slave Law: History and Ideology, 91 YALE L. J. 1034, 1037-44 (1982); Julius
Yanuck, Thomas Ruffin and North Carolina Slave Law, 21 J. S. HIST. 456, 459-75 (1955);
Frederick Wertheim, Note, Slavery and the Fellow Servant Rule: An Antebellum Dilemma,
61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1112, 1133-47 (1986) (discussing Ruffin's preference for contract
instead of applying a new tort rule).
65. See generally Robert W. Gordon, J. Willard Hurst and the Common Law Tradition
in American Legal Historiography, 10 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 9 (1975) (describing the period
from 1800-1900 as a "classical period" in American Law); David M. Rabban, The
Historiography of Late-Nineteenth Century American Legal History, 4 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES IN LAW 541 (2003) (drawing from primary sources to achieve a holistic view of
"late nineteenth-century American legal scholarship"). For some of the literature on
antebellum jurisprudence, see HOWARD SCHWEBER, THE CREATION OF THE COMMON
LAW, 1850-1880: TECHNOLOGY, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF CITIZENSHIP
168-225 (2004). See generally Alfred L. Brophy, Reason and Sentiment: The Moral
Worlds and Modes of Reasoning of Antebellum Jurists, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1161 (1999)
(discussing Peter Karstan's interpretation of judicial reasoning and antebellum legal
thoughts in PETER KARSTAN, HEART VERSUS HEAD: JUDGE-MADE LAW IN
NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (1997)); Michael Hoeflich, Law and Geometry: Legal
Science from Liebniz to Langdell, 30 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 95 (1986) (discussing "the
Langdellian notion of law as science").
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ways legal doctrine mixed with history and morals. State v. Mann is
one such example.66
I. STABILITY AND ANTEBELLUM JURISPRUDENCE
Ruffin's opinions collectively portray him as a representative of
the antebellum era: a conservative judge who separated law from
morality, who revered precedent and feared departure from
precedent, and who took the world as it was. Sometimes he spoke of
concern for economic growth, but he was cautious, in the mold of
Chancellor Kent and conservative thinkers like Edmund Burke rather
than even Justice Story.67 Indeed, the antebellum era idealized a
jurisprudence of conservatism-a concern for economic growth, a
respect for contracts and individualism.68 Henry St. George Tucker
told students at the University of Virginia Law School in 1841 that
lawyers are "bred up to a love of order."69 In fact, Daniel Lord's 1851
address at Yale University focused on the role that lawyers, like
ministers, serve in stabilizing society. 0
66. For more on these rich sources, see generally ROBERT W. FERGUSON, LAW AND
LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1984); PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN
AMERICA: FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH CIVIL WAR (1965); Alfred L. Brophy, The
Fugitive Slave Act, in ANTEBELLUM JURISPRUDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONS IN
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 109-28 (Daniel W. Hamilton & Alfred L. Brophy eds.,
forthcoming 2009); Alfred L. Brophy, The Intersection of Property and Slavery in
Southern Legal Thought: From Missouri Compromise Through Civil War, 109-25 (2001)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with Davis Library,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill).
67. Ruffin warned in dissent in State v. Caesar, 31 N.C. (9 Ired.) 394, 415 (1849) (per
curiam), about the need for caution in departing from or extending precedent:
Judges cannot, indeed, be too sensible of the difficulty and delicacy of the task of
adjusting the rules of law to new subjects; and therefore they should be and are
proportionally cautious against rash expositions, not suited to the actual state of
things and not calculated to promote the security of persons, the stability of
national institutions and the common welfare. It was but an instance of the
practical wisdom which is characteristic of the common law and its judicial
ministers as a body, that the courts should in those cases, have shown themselves
so explicit in stating the general principle on which the rules of law on this subject




69. HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, INTRODUCTORY LECTURE GIVEN TO THE LAW
CLASS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA 7-8 (Charlottesville, Va., Hagruder & Noel
1841).
70. Lord, supra note 49, at 7 (stating that the bar is the more "practical counselors of
society on its general interests"). In fact, college literary addresses frequently emphasized
law's ability to stabilize American society and the need for it to do so. See Alfred L.
Brophy, The Rule of Law in Antebellum College Literary Addresses: The Case of William
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No one, then, would expect to find Ruffin to be anything more
than an expositor of the system. By nature of his position, one could
hardly expect him to be a reformer-for reformers had, most often, to
be critics of the common law. They might be like William Sampson,
who boldly criticized the common law with a reference to the corrupt
soothsayers of ancient Rome.71  "Cicero wondered how two
soothsayers could look each other in the face," Sampson said.7 2 "I
wonder how the two learned expounders of the common law opposed
to us can do so without laughing. ' 73 Or, as Sampson later referred to
it, the common law was like a pagan god to whom devotees offered
incense:
[L]ong after [Americans] had set the great example of self-
government upon principles of perfect equality, had reduced
the practice of religion to its purest principles, executed mighty
works, and acquired renown in arts and arms, had still one
pagan idol to which they daily offered up much smoky incense.
They called it by the mystical and cabalistic name of Common
Law. A mysterious essence. Like the Dalai Lama, not to be
seen or visited in open day; of most indefinite antiquity;
sometimes in the decrepitude of age, and sometimes in the
bloom of infancy, yet still the same that was, and was to be, and
evermore to sit cross-legged and motionless upon its antique
altar, for no use or purpose, but to be praised and worshipped
by ignorant and superstitious votaries.74
Greene, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 231, 231-85 (2001). Other evidence of what the common law
meant comes from southern literary journals. See, e.g., The Judiciary System of South
Carolina, 2 S.Q. REV. 464, 464-85 (1850); Law and Lawyers, 6 S.Q. REV. 370, 370-427
(1844); Law Reform in Missouri; Law of the State of Missouri, Regulating Pleadings and
Practice in Courts of Justice, 1 S.Q. REV. 1, 1-18 (1850); The Roman Law, 8 S.Q. REV. 93,
93-117 (1845); Slavery and the Abolitionists, Address from the Southern Delegates in
Congress, 15 S.Q. REV. 165, 165-223 (1849); Nathaniel Beverley Tucker, Lecture to Law
Students by Professor B. Tucker, 1 S. LITERARY MESSENGER 145-54 (1834); A Virginian,
Remarks on a Note to Blackstone's Commentaries, 2 S. LITERARY MESSENGER 266-70
(1835).
71. People v. Melvin, 1 Yates Sel. Cas. 112, 153 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809); see also The
Trial of James Melvin and Others for Conspiracy to Raise Wages, New York City, 1810, in
xiii AMERICAN STATE TRIALS 576, 615 (John D. Lawson ed., 1921) (chronicling the trial
of James Melvin and others for a conspiracy to raise wages).
72. See AMERICAN STATE TRIALS, supra note 71, at 615.
73. Id.
74. William Sampson, An Anniversary Discourse Delivered Before the New York
Historical Society, (Dec. 6, 1823), in SAMPSON'S DISCOURSE, AND CORRESPONDENCE
WITH VARIOUS LEARNED JURISTS UPON THE HISTORY OF THE LAW 11-12 (New York,
E. Bliss & E. White 1824).
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In Timothy Walker's address, given in the wake of the Fugitive
Slave Act of 1850, he warned of the dangers of the extremities of
reform, such as women's rights and the abolition of slavery and the
death penalty: "[T]he great want of our age is Moderation. The
lesson we should draw, from the survey we have taken, is neither to
be obstinately conservative, nor rashly progressive."75 He perceived
the agitation for change, which was sweeping the United States:
Everywhere, on every matter, and in all ways, the great heart of
humanity throbs for reform. The shout that goes up from
myriad voices, all over the globe, is,-Let old things be done
away, and all things become new; let the old landmarks be
obliterated. We will no longer walk in the ancient paths; no
longer work with the ancient tools; no longer think in the
ancient formulas; no longer believe the ancient creeds. The
times are sadly out of joint. We must reform them altogether.
To this end, we pronounce antiquity a humbug, precedent a
sham, prescription a lie, and reverence folly. We have been
priest-ridden, and king-ridden, and judge-ridden, and school-
ridden, and wealth-ridden, long enough. And now the time is
come to declare our independence in all these respects. We
cannot, indeed, change the past,-that is for ever immutably
fixed; but we can repudiate it, and we do. We can shape our
own future, and it shall be a glorious one. Now shall commence
a new age,-of gold, or of silver, or of iron, but an age of
emancipation. We will up heave society from its deepest
foundations, and have all but a new creation. In religion and
politics, medicine and law, morals and manners, our mission is
to revolutionize the world. And therefore we wage
indiscriminate war against all establishments. Our ancestors
shall no longer be our masters. We renounce all fealty to their
antiquated notions. Henceforth to be old is to be questionable.
We will hold nothing sacred which has long been worshiped,
and nothing venerable which has long been venerated.7"
II. RUFFIN'S SLAVERY JURISPRUDENCE
Perhaps no cases better illustrate Ruffin's jurisprudence and his
moral philosophy better than those in which the institution of slavery
was, even if tangentially, part of the court's inquiry. Those cases bear
several hallmarks of a conservative jurisprudence: reasoning from the
75. TIMOTHY WALKER, THE REFORM SPIRIT OF THE DAY, AN ORATION BEFORE
THE PHI BETA KAPPA SOCIETY OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY 36-37 (Boston, James
Munroe & Co. 1850).
76. Id. at 5-6.
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world as it is and looking to what he believed to be the nature of
enslaved people who Ruffin believed were ignorant and must be
made to bear the burden of their enslavement. He was wedded to
precedent when available but willing to reason his way to a solution
(often using principles of utility) when precedent was unavailable.78
He might reason from analogy, but the new principles had to be
clearly deducible from precedent.79
And when an intelligible principle is explicitly laid down in an
adjudication, or necessarily results from it, every consideration
of judicial prudence, of the security of the citizen, and of that
quiet of mind which a known law inspires in contradistinction to
unknown and uncertain opinions, which successive judges may
individually entertain, should impart to such principle the
authority of law.8"
In some cases Ruffin continued with the approach he took in
State v. Mann to set law in distinction to humanity. In the criminal
case of State v. Hoover,8 decided a decade after Mann in 1839, Ruffin
was again remarkably frank. Again, he confronted a criminal
prosecution of a white person for abusing a slave.82 The result was
different from Mann, however, for Hoover upheld the conviction of a
slave-owner for the murder of a pregnant slave, Mira." Ruffin spoke
of his "deep sorrow."84 Ruffin's decision in Hoover acknowledges the
assumption in State v. Mann that a slave owner could punish his slave
in a manner limited only by "his own judgment and humanity."85
"[I]n the nature of things" owners have a degree of latitude that non-
owners did not.86 But it is "self-evident" that such circumstances
would not relieve the owner of all legal culpability here.87 It was the
court's "duty" to explain the circumstances why this owner was liable
77. See, e.g., State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263, 266-67 (1830).
78. Id.
79. See State v. Caesar, 31 N.C. (9 Ired. Eq.) 391, 415 (1849) (stating the importance
and "pressing necessity" of following precedent so that people can understand their rights
and obligations in the context of their interactions with others, especially when these
interactions become violent).
80. Id. at 416.
81. 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 500, 503 (1839).
82. See generally id.
83. Id. at 500-01; see also id. at 503 ("But it is almost self-evident that this prisoner
can claim no extenuation of his guilt below the highest grade.").
84. Id. at 502.
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for homicide.88 "The acts imputed to this unhappy man do not belong
to a state of civilization." 9 Then, in language easily prescient-for
Stowe uses similar language regarding Ruffin less than a decade and a
half later-he says, "[t]hey are barbarities which could only be
prompted by a heart in which every humane feeling had long been
stifled; and indeed there can scarcely be a savage of the wilderness so
ferocious as to not shudder at the recital of them."9"
In other cases, Ruffin turned to his understanding of slaves'
behavior to decide the appropriate legal response. In State v. Caesar91
he confronted the question of what constituted provocation in the
context of homicide.92 Essentially, the question was how much abuse
would slaves have to endure at the hands of white men before they
could fight back and claim they had been so provoked that a homicide
was reduced from murder to manslaughter.93 Where the majority of
the court found that mitigation was possible, Ruffin dissented.94 He
urged attention to precedent and explained why precedent is
important:
The dissimilarity in the condition of slaves from anything
known at the common law cannot be denied; and, therefore, as
it appears to me, the rules upon this, as upon all other kinds of
intercourse between white men and slaves, must vary from
those applied by the common law .... Judges cannot, indeed,
be too sensible of the difficulty and delicacy of the task of
adjusting the rules of law to new subjects; and therefore they
should be and are proportionally cautious against rash
expositions, not suited to the actual state of things and not
calculated to promote the security of persons, the stability of
national institutions and the common welfare.95
Ruffin spoke of previous courts' employment of "practical
wisdom" of the common law and their application of general rules as
well as their "guarded ... respect to the rules themselves in detail." 96
For precedent "as far as it goes ... affords a safe footing upon firm




91. 31 N.C. (9 Ired.) 391 (1849) (per curiam).
92. Id. at 391.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 405.
95. Id. at 415.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 417.
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observance about the behavior of slaves and from this particular case
that there should be no mitigation. He reasoned from what he
believed to be the state of things:
[E]very individual in the community feels and understands that
the homicide of a slave may be extenuated by acts which would
not constitute a legal provocation if done by a white person.98
So, it follows, as certainly as day follows night, that many things
which drove a white man to madness will not have the like
effect if done by a white man to a slave.99
Ruffin was trying to make what he wished-a world of
subservience-a reality.
In other slave cases, Ruffin turned again to his understanding of
human nature. He decided an evidentiary question in State v.
Charity"°° on "general principles" when he could find no precedent." 1
Charity involved the trial of a slave for a capital crime (the murder of
her child) and whether her owner could be compelled to testify
against her.1°2 Ruffin would not permit a master to testify in favor of
a slave (the master's pecuniary interest was too great); consequently,
in a form of equality of treatment, Ruffin would not compel a master
to testify against a slave." 3 Chief Justice Henderson's concurrence
shed different light, however. Henderson thought that masters'
testimony about slaves' confessions should not be admitted because
"[t]he master has an almost absolute control over both the body and
mind of his slave. The master's will is the slave's will."'" Moreover,
Henderson thought masters should be protectors of their slaves and,
thus, not compelled to testify against them.105 Ruffin and Henderson
arrived at the same result though from very different angles.
Judge Ruffin relied on his understanding of slave personality in
civil cases as well. In Heathcock v. Pennington,"6 Ruffin wrote of the
ordinary duty of care required of people who rented slaves: "a slave,
being a moral and intelligent being, is usually as capable of self-
preservation as other persons. Hence, the same constant oversight
and control are not requisite for his preservation as for that of a
98. Id. at 422-23 (quoting State v. Tackett, 8 N.C. (1 Hawks) 210, 217 (1820)).
99. Id. at 423.
100. 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 543 (1830).
101. Id. at 543.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 543-45.
104. Id. at 548 (Henderson, C.J., concurring).
105. Id. at 549.
106. 33 N.C. (11 Ired.) 640 (1850) (per curiam).
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lifeless thing, or of an irrational animal.""1 7 Ruffin, then, absolved an
operator of a mine shaft of liability to his owner for the death of a
young slave who was employed there and had, late at night, fallen
into the shaft and died.0 8 Heathcock was part of the emergence of a
modern tort law, which left the owner of a slave with a limited
remedy and facilitated the operation of the mine at a low cost. The
mine had to keep operating twenty-four hours a day and "some one
had necessarily to perform this service at those times":0 9
No one could suppose that the boy, knowing the place and its
dangers, would incur the risk of stumbling into the shaft by not
keeping wide awake. It was his misfortune to resemble the
soldier sleeping at his post, who pays the penalty by being
surprised and put to death. The event is to be attributed to one
of those mischances, to which all are more or less exposed, and
not, in particular, to want of care by the defendant."'
Similarly, in Parham v. Blackwelder,"' Ruffin further explored
the nature of slaves' personality and the law's need to decouple an
owner's liability from torts committed by her slaves."2 Parham arose
when a slave owned by Amelia Parham cut wood and carried it away
from Elizabeth Blackwelder's property." 3 There was no precedent
supporting an owner's liability for the intentional torts of their
slaves." 4 Ruffin found that there was no liability given the nature and
extent of slavery:
107. Id. at 643.
108. Id. at 646.
109. Id. at 645.
110. Id. at 646. In dissent in Wiswall v. Brinson, 32 N.C. (10 Ired.) 554, 563-79 (1849)
(per curiam), Ruffin tried to limit the liability of a property owner for the damage caused
by one of his employees to a neighbor's horse. Id. The property owner, Wiswall,
contracted to have a house moved two hundred yards, from one of his properties to
another the contractor and dug a hole on a public road as part of the moving. Id. at 554.
Later that evening, as Brinson was driving a coach over the road, one of his horses was
injured by the hole. Over a vigorous and lengthy dissent by Ruffin, the supreme court
concluded that Wiswell was liable for the negligence of the contractor. Id. at 563-79.
Limitation of the liability of owners and employers was important to Ruffin. He
dissented in Hunter v. Jameson, 28 N.C. (6 Ired.) 252 (1846), from the North Carolina
Supreme Court's imposition of a warranty of fitness. Id. at 259-67. The seller's agent had
warranted the goods, without the seller's permission. Id. at 252-53. Taken together, these
illustrate Ruffin's desire to limit liability, in contract, tort, and property cases, especially
when humans (free or slave), other than the person held liable, were the agents of the
damage.
111. 30 N.C. (8 Ired.) 446 (1848).
112. Id. at 447.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 447 (discussing whether slave owners should be legally responsible for their
slaves' trespasses).
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[W]e believe the law does not hold one person answerable for
the wrongs of another person. It would be most dangerous and
unreasonable if it did, as it is impossible for society to subsist
without some persons being in the service of others, and it
would put employers entirely in the power of those who have,
often, no good-will to them, to ruin them.'15
Ruffin took the realities and needs of the slave system into account.
III. EMANCIPATION CASES
One way of gauging Ruffin's views is through an examination of
his opinions on emancipation by will. Attempts of emancipation by
will took several primary forms-immediate emancipation by will,
establishment of a trust for emancipation, or establishment of a trust
to hold the slaves in quasi-slavery. 116  Ruffin interpreted these
doctrines over several decades and nearly two dozen cases.
Southern states varied in their approaches to emancipation by
will and via trust. An 1830 act of the North Carolina legislature
largely prohibited emancipation via wills;" 7 emancipation was largely
limited to cases where the county court found there had been
meritorious service."' Likewise, in Alabama"9 and Mississippi,"'
emancipation was prohibited via will.1 21 However, southern courts
were surprisingly willing to accept trusts for emancipation. Even
Mississippi, which statutorily prohibited emancipation by will, 22 gave
115. Id. Moreover, he drew upon the common proslavery argument that compared
poor whites with slaves and argued that slaves were treated better. Id. at 448. In this case,
Ruffin thought that poor free workers would have little resources: "For, in general, the
pecuniary responsibility of menials, though so by contract, is but nominal, and, in cases of
aggravated injuries, it is altogether inadequate." Id.
116. See, e.g., Sorrey v. Bright, 21 N.C. (Dev. & Bat. Eq.) 113, 115 (1835) (striking
down an attempt to gain quasi-freedom).
117. 2 N.C. Rev. Stat. ch. 111, § 59 (1837) (stating multiple conditions to freeing a slave
by will, including not interfering "with the claims of creditors").
118. 2 N.C. Rev. Stat. ch. 111, § 60 (1837) (defining meritorious service as "more than
mere general performance of duty").
119. See, e.g., Creswell's Executor v. Walker, 37 Ala. 229, 238 (1861); Carroll v.
Brumby, 13 Ala. 102, 105 (1848).
120. See MISS. CODE ch. 37, § 11 (1848).
121. See generally Stephen D. Davis II & Alfred L. Brophy, "The Most Esteemed Act
of My Life": Family, Property, Will, and Trust in the Antebellum South (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing empirical study of patterns of testation,
particularly as they related to slaves, in antebellum Alabama).
122. See MISS. CODE ch. 37, § 11 (1848) ("[I]t shall be unlawful for any person, by last
will or testament, to make any devise or bequest of any slave ... for the purpose of
emancipation."); Garnett v. Cowles, 39 Miss. (10 George) 60, 60 (1860)
[Vol. 87
2009] MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND MONUMENTS 819
effect to a trust that resulted in freedom for the testator's slaves.
12 3
An owner could emancipate using a testamentary trust to take the
slaves outside of the state and emancipate them.
124
Ruffin's first opinion on emancipation via will, Sorrey v. Bright,1
25
decided in 1835, struck down what became known as a trust for quasi-
freedom, in essence giving slaves their freedom while still holding
them as property. 126 A testator bequeathed several slaves to John
Simmons with the restriction that the "negroes [were] to have the
result of their own labor, but ever to be under [Simmons'] care and
protection . ".. ,127 Ruffin refused to give effect to this, for "every
trust for emancipation, and every direction in a will to that end,
whether the emancipation is to be absolute or qualified, is illegal and
void. ,128
Ruffin construed powers of emancipation fairly broadly and
upheld a claim of a person alleging that he had been freed against a
claim of a creditor of the slave's former owner's estate. 129 The North
Carolina legislature had (seemingly) reversed the common law
preference for inferring intent for emancipation. 30 Still, Ruffin found
that the owner had completed the acts for emancipation and, thus, the
slave was free.' And in White v. Green,32 Ruffin found that two
slaves who were to have been freed via will and provided with a small
plot of land and a few animals, were-instead of becoming free-part
of the general estate and thus subject to be used to satisfy the estate's
debts.'33 White relied heavily upon English precedent in interpreting
how to characterize the two slaves who were to be freed, but were
not: as property of the surviving spouse or as residual (called surplus)
property of the estate.' Ruffin characterized them as property of the
123. See Garnett v. Cowles, 39 Miss. (10 George) 60, 64 (1860); Read v. Manning, 30
Miss. 308, 317-18 (1855).
124. See supra note 123.
125. 21 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat. Eq) 113 (1835).
126. Id. at 114-15.
127. Id. at 113.
128. Id. at 115.
129. Sampson v. Burgwin, 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 28, 30 (1838).
130. Id. at 31 (noting the North Carolina legislature's additional requirements for
emancipation).
131. Id. at 32.
132. 36 N.C. (1 Ired. Eq.) 45 (1840).
133. Id. at 52.
134. Id. at 50-51 (discussing "estates by implication" as explained in Hutton v.
Simpson, 2 Vern. 723 (1716) and Willis v. Lucas, 1 P. Wms. 472 (1718)).
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estate rather than the surviving spouse and then made them liable to
pay the debts of the estate.'35
Ruffin's opinions regarding Sarah Freeman's estate began in
1844 and ran through 1851.136 His opinions distinguished between
trusts to take people outside of the state and free them and those that
held slaves in a state of qualified slavery (or quasi-freedom) in the
state. 3 7 The former were acceptable; the later, prohibited.138 The
first appearance of Freeman's will before the North Carolina
Supreme Court, in Thompson v. Newlin,'3 9 dealt with whether an
executor must investigate allegations that there was a secret trust to
hold slaves in quasi-freedom. 4 ' The intestate heirs of a Quaker,
Sarah Freeman, alleged that she had created a secret trust for another
Quaker, John Newlin, who would transport her nearly thirty slaves to
a free state and emancipate them. 141 (The idea behind a secret trust is
that a donor gives a donee property. It looks like the gift is outright,
but there is a secret agreement between the donor and the donee
about what the donee will do with the property.) Ruffin ordered an
investigation of whether there was such a secret agreement in this
case.'42 He demanded an answer to the question of what the purpose
of the secret trust was-to transport and emancipate them or hold
them in quasi-freedom in North Carolina, for "[t]he law will not allow
itself to be baffled, and its policy evaded, by secret agreements, the
very objects of which are to defeat the law itself.1 43 Ruffin's opinion
in the case refused to give effect to a secret trust that would have
135. Id. at 51-54.
136. See generally Thompson v. Newlin, 43 N.C. (8 Ired. Eq.) 32 (1851) (affirming the
validity of trusts providing for removal of slaves from North Carolina in order to
emancipate them); Thompson v. Newlin, 41 N.C. (6 Ired. Eq.) 380 (1849); Newlin v.
Freeman, 39 N.C. (4 Ired. Eq.) 312 (1846) (holding that land bought by the wife could not
be disposed of by her will if the articles of marriage did not provide for its disposal);
Thompson v. Newlin, 38 N.C. (3 Ired. Eq.) 338 (1844) (alleging a secret trust for the
benefit of slaves); see also Lemmond v. Peoples, 41 N.C. (6 Ired. Eq.) 137, 139 (1848) (per
curiam) (invalidating secret trust for quasi-slavery).
137. See Thompson, 38 N.C. (3 Ired. Eq.) at 338 (upholding the right to remove slaves
from the state and free them); Sorrey v. Bright, 21 N.C. 113, 115 (1835) (invalidating a
trust for quasi-freedom or quasi-slavery).
138. See supra note 137.
139. 38 N.C. (3 Ired. Eq.) 338.
140. Id. at 340.
141. Id. at 338-39.
142. Id. at 340.
143. Id. at 342.
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essentially emancipated slaves (he referred to it as a state of quasi-
slavery) and kept them within North Carolina.
144
By 1850, the case was again before the North Carolina Supreme
Court, and the donee, John Newlin, had sent Sarah Freeman's thirty-
five to forty slaves to Ohio and emancipated them.145 Ruffin upheld
that emancipation-perhaps he could do nothing else at that point,
although he might have held Newlin civilly liable. And on a petition
for rehearing in 1851, he similarly upheld the secret trust.146 Ruffin
cited other cases, like Cameron v. Commissioners of Raleigh,47 that
permitted transportation outside of the state for emancipation.1 48 He
characterized Cox v. Williams149 as holding that "the policy of our law,
as collected from the only legitimate source-our Legislature-was
said to be opposed to the residence of freed negroes in this State."' °
But, it did nothing to prevent emancipation outside the state. He
thought it a duty to turn to other states "similarly situated with
ourselves for aid in sustaining our judgments."'' In the pages of other
states' reporters he found precedent for relief: Frazier v. Frazier152
from South Carolina, as well as Ross v. Duncan'53 and Ross v.
Vertner5 4 from Mississippi, supported the position that slaves might
be sent from a state and emancipated, even if they could not be
emancipated within the state.'55
So, while North Carolina restricted emancipation of slaves via
will, they could be put in trust to someone who would free them in
another state. In Cox v. Williams,'56 coming in the midst of the
Newlin saga, Ruffin clarified the rights of the master to emancipate,
as long as the slaves left the state.'57 The right was based on the
144. Id. at 341; see also Redmond v. Coffin, 17 N.C. (2 Dev. Eq.) 437, 440-41 (1833)
(holding that an estate bequeathing slaves for the purpose of emancipation is void in
North Carolina).
145. Thompson, 43 N.C. (8 Ired. Eq.) at 33-35.
146. Id. at 46-47.
147. 36 N.C. (1 Ired. Eq.) 436 (1841).
148. Thompson, 43 N.C. (8 Ired. Eq.) at 45.
149. 39 N.C. (4 Ired. Eq.) 15 (1845).
150. Thompson, 43 N.C. (8 Ired. Eq.) at 45 (citing Cox v. Williams, 39 N.C. (4 Ired.
Eq.) 15 (1845)).
151. Id. at 48.
152. 11 S.C. Eq. (2 Hill Eq.) 304 (1835).
153. 1 Freem. Ch. 587 (Miss. ca. 1840).
154. 6 Miss. (5 Howard) 305 (1840).
155. Thompson, 43 N.C. (8 Ired. Eq.) at 48-49.
156. 39 N.C. (4 Ired. Eq.) 15 (1845).
157. Id. at 16-18; see also Memory F. Mitchell, Off to Africa with Judicial Blessing, 53
N.C. HIST. REV. 265, 269-71 (1976) (discussing the background and opinion of Cox v.
Williams, and highlighting the distinctions between valid and invalid bequests of slaves).
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natural right of property owners to dispose of property. "In the
nature of things, the owner of a slave may renounce his ownership,
and the slave will thereby be manumitted, and that natural right
continues until restrained by positive statutes."'58 Ruffin attributed
the legislative policy against emancipation to the finding that they
were "a charge on the community" and a "common nuisance"
because of their "idleness and dishonesty."' 59 Police power regulation
that prohibited emancipation by any means other than by leave of a
court on showing of meritorious service "was not intended to impose
any restriction on the natural right of an owner to free his slaves."16
If the slaves were removed from the state before being freed, that was
perfectly acceptable. Ruffin attributed the legislative preference
against emancipation to a concern over the burden that emancipation
imposed on the community:
[T]hat was purely a regulation of police, and for the promotion
of the security and quiet of the people of this State....
Emancipation was not prohibited for the sake merely of
keeping persons in servitude in this State, and increasing the
number of slaves, for the law never restrained their
exportation .... "161
Of course, the slaves could not be freed unless there was money
in the estate, for "[j]ustice stands," Ruffin wrote, "before
generosity.' 1 62  Green v. Lane,16' coming at the end of the Newlin
saga, illustrates the distinction between a trust to remove slaves and
free them and a trust to hold them in semi-freedom (or quasi-slavery)
in North Carolina."6 The testator, William Morris, executed a will in
1831 (written by William Gaston, later a justice of the North Carolina
Supreme Court) directing his executors to take his slaves out of the
state and freedom free them (he had already apparently taken them




162. Id. at 19 (citing Thompson v. Newlin, 38 N.C. (3 Ired. Eq.) 338, 343 (1844));
Cameron v. Comm'rs of Raleigh, 36 N.C. (1 Ired. Eq.) 436, 439-40 (1841); Haywood v.
Craven, 4 N.C. (Car. L. Rep.) 360, 363-64 (1816)); see also Thompson v. Newlin, 43 N.C.
(8 Ired. Eq.) 32, 46 (1851) ("[T]he power of the owner to give, and the capacity of the
slave to receive, freedom, exist in nature, and therefore may be used in every case and
every way, except those in which it is forbidden by law."). Or, as Ruffin phrased it in
Lemmond v. Peoples, 41 N.C. (6 Ired. Eq.) 137 (1849), "[e]very country has the right to
protect itself from a population, dangerous to its morality or peace; and hence the policy
of the law of this State prevents the emancipation of slaves." Id. at 140.
163. 43 N.C. (8 Ired. Eq.) 70 (1851).
164. Id. at 78-79.
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to Pennsylvania and freed them, then returned to North Carolina in
1828 and, thus, likely held them in quasi-freedom during his life).
165
A subsequent codicil directed that his executors keep the slaves and
hold them in quasi-freedom in North Carolina.166  Thus, the
attempted emancipation was void.'67 Ruffin saw the obvious parallels
to the infamous case of Hinds v. Brazealle,68 one of the few cases that
rivaled State v. Mann in the abolitionist repertoire, and he cited Hinds
for further support.'69
It took relatively little, however, to trigger a finding that the trust
was for the slaves. In some cases, the bequest was quite patently for
the benefit of the slaves. Thus, the donee was instructed in Stevens v.
Ely'70 to "permit the said negroes and their increase to live together,
upon [the donee's] land and to be industriously employed, and
continue to exercise a controlling power over their moral condition,
and to furnish [them] with the necessaries and comforts of life."''
Yet, in other instances, the restraints on the donee were slight. Thus,
in Huckaby v. Jones,172 the four donees were given the slaves "to be
their lawful property, and for them to keep or dispose of as they shall
judge most for the glory of God and good of [the] said slaves.' 1 73 In
those instances, the gifts for quasi-freedom were open and obvious
and, obviously, invalid.
Lemmond v. Peoples174 likewise prohibited a secret trust to hold
slaves for the benefit of the slaves, rather than the donee. 175 "[T]he
donee of the legal title cannot, in conscience, hold the negro as
property for himself, but must execute it for some one, and, as there is
no one else who can claim, it must be for the donor. '176 Lemmond
addressed the meaning of slavery, for the donees in Lemmond
claimed that the gift of slaves was to them and that the donor gave the
slaves to them because they would treat the slaves kindly. 77 The
slaves were to be held as property; they were not to be freed. But
165. Id. at 74, 76-77.
166. Id. at 75.
167. Id. at 70.
168. 3 Miss. (2 Howard) 837 (1838).
169. 43 N.C. (8 Ired. Eq.) 74 (1851).
170. 16 N.C. (1 Dev. Eq.) 493 (1830).
171. Id. at 493.
172. 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) 120 (1822).
173. Id. at 121.
174. 41 N.C. (6 Ired. Eq.) 137 (1849).
175. Id. at 139-40 (citing Stevens v. Ely, 16 N.C. (1 Dev. Eq.) 493, 494-95 (1830) and
Thompson v. Newlin, 38 N.C. (3 Ired. Eq.) 338, 341-42 (1844)).
176. Lemmond, 41 N.C. (6 Ired. Eq.) at 137.
177. Id. at 139.
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Ruffin used this conclusion as evidence of what distinguished slavery
and freedom. Such holding of slaves "would not come up to the claim
of the property, absolute and unconditional.' ' 178 If the slaves were to
receive the kindness of the donees, "How, then and why, were the
defendants to have this absolute property?" '179 The donees were:
to provide for the protection, comfort, and happiness of the
woman and her children, and that was to be effected, not by
exacting moderate labor from them as humane masters, but by
the [donees'] placing them, upon a colorable contract for a
small consideration, ... [with] no control being exercised over
them by the [donees] but such as might be necessary for their
proper conduct and maintenance. 8 °
This was a plain case of quasi-freedom, for-in language reminiscent
of State v. Mann-Ruffin found "the family is only required to
maintain themselves and the authority to be exercised over the
children is that, not of owners, but of parents."18'
One of Ruffin's last decisions reaffirmed the right to remove
slaves for emancipation. 182 Further, he even upheld the right to place
the choice of slavery or freedom with the slaves.'83 Anne L. Woods
placed three slaves in trust for her (Woods') life, with Osmond F.
Long as trustee."84 Upon Anne Woods' death, the slaves had the
choice of going to Liberia or remaining in slavery in North
Carolina. It was, by 1858, well established that a donor could free
slaves after transporting them outside the state. 86 However, Ruffin
confronted the question whether the slaves could be given the choice
of freedom or not. Here he recognized-as he did in tort and
criminal law cases-their humanity, even if considerations of
humanity would not motivate him to take action to protect them:
From the nature of slavery they are denied a legal capacity to
make contracts or acquire property while remaining in that
State; but they are responsible human beings, having
intelligence to know right from wrong, and perceptions of
pleasure and pain, and of the difference between bondage and
178. Id. at 141.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 142 (internal quotations omitted).
181. Id.
182. See Redding v. Findley, 57 N.C. (4 Jones Eq.) 216, 217 (1858).
183. Id. at 218-19.
184. Id. at 215-16.
185. Id. at 216.
186. Id. at 217.
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freedom, and thus, by nature, they are competent to give or
withhold their assent to things that concern their state.87
Again, Ruffin employed natural law to decide the case. For he
believed that there was no need to have a "municipal law" to have the
right to manumission or to accept emancipation: "They pre-exist, and
are founded in nature just as other capacities for dealings between
man and man. 188
To some extent, Ruffin was pragmatic when interpreting owners'
attempts to free slaves via will (or trust created through a will). He
was willing to interpret, at least somewhat broadly, the owners' power
to free via will. 189 At some times, when Ruffin issued a decision that
resulted in continued slavery, he revealed something like sympathy.
For instance, his 1842 decision in Mayho v. Sears9 ° bears striking
resemblance to the self-reflection that made Mann famous. In
Mayho, Ruffin confronted a claim to freedom by the grandson of a
freed slave, Polly. 9' Polly's owner, John Munroe, had executed a
deed of manumission in 1805 that would give Polly her freedom in
April 1814.192 Around 1810, Polly had a daughter.193 Both Polly and
her daughter lived as freed people after 1814.219 That daughter in
turn had a son around 1830.'9 Then in 1838, Munroe sold Polly's
grandson.' 96 So, Ruffin confronted the question of whether Polly's
daughter (and grandson) were the property of Munroe, because the
daughter had been born before Polly was free. 197 Ruffin spoke in
terms reminiscent of his moral quandary in State v. Mann:
There is a natural inclination in the bosom of every Judge to
favor the side of freedom, and a strong sympathy with the
plaintiff, and the other persons situated as he is, who have been
allowed to think themselves free and act for so long a time as if
they were.' 98
But Ruffin would not act on his "feelings." For he concluded "the
Court is to be governed by a different rule, the impartial and
187. Id. at 218-19.
188. Id. at 219.
189. See Cox v. Williams, 39 N.C. (4 Ired. Eq.) 15, 17 (1845).
190. 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 224 (1842).
191. Id. at 224, 231.
192. Id. at 224-25.
193. Id. at 225.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 225-26.
197. Id. at 226-27.
198. Mayho v. Sears, 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 224, 226 (1842).
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unyielding rule of the law ... in law, the condition of the plaintiff is
that of slavery." '199 He concluded the opinion "it becomes our duty to
affirm the judgment; consoling ourselves that the sentence is not ours,
but that of the law, whose ministers only we are."200 Ruffin largely
abandoned talk of the disjunction between his feelings and his duty as
a magistrate after Mayho; in fact, he largely abandoned the talk after
Mann.2 ol
Earlier, in the 1833 case of Redmond v. Coffin,02 Ruffin
emphatically denied the power of a testator who died in 1816 to leave
his slaves to the New Garden Quaker Meeting, so that they might be
freed. But Redmond-like Mann and Mayho-recognized that
emancipation was a sentiment that pulled at the heart and was viewed
as just:
However praiseworthy the motive for accepting such a trust, or
however benevolent the will of the donor may be, it cannot be
supported in a court of justice. A stern necessity arising out of
the safety of the commonwealth forbids it .... That is not an
odious, but it is a dangerous and unlawful species of mortmain;
and a trust results to the next of kin, where there is no residuary
clause.2°3
At the margins, then, Ruffin hinted that sympathy might affect
legal doctrine. Cannon v. Jenkins2" allowed an executor to sell as
estates slaves in family groups, rather than singly (where they would
return greater value), because "the Court would not punish [the
executor] for acting on the common sympathies of our nature unless
in so doing he hath plainly injured those with whose interest he stands
charged." ' 5 It usually did not, however.
20 6
Ruffin's ability to "see through" led him to understand and
acknowledge slaves' powers of reasoning as humans, though not their
199. Id. at 226.
200. Id. at 232.
201. For another opinion along these lines, see generally State v. Williams, 39 N.C. (4
Ired. Eq.) 15 (1845).
202. 17 N.C. (2 Dev. Eq.) 437 (1833).
203. Id. at 440-41. Redmond cited, among other precedent, Trustees of Quaker Society
of Contentnea v. Dickenson, 12 N.C. (1 Dev.) 189 (1827), which had prohibited a trust of
slaves. Dickenson derived in part from suspicion of religious trusts, as well as opposition
to emancipation. Id. at 189; see also White v. White, 18 N.C (1 Dev. & Bat.) 260, 268-69
(1833) (refusing to give relief to a claim that Quakers held slaves in quasi-freedom).
204. 16 N.C. (1 Dev. Eq.) 422 (1830).
205. Id. at 426; see also Tarkinton v. Guyther, 35 N.C. (13 Ired. Law) 100, 101-02
(1851).
206. See, e.g., Griffin v. Simpson, 33 N.C. (11 Ired. Eq.) 126, 129-30 (1850) (holding a
widow accountable to her husband's estate for money used to pay his funeral costs).
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humanity. °7 In upholding a trust for emancipation established by will
that freed a testator's slave if-and only if-they agreed to leave the
state, Ruffin addressed the argument that slaves should not have the
legal capacity to choose between staying in slavery in North Carolina
and becoming free by leaving the state. "[I]t is not true in point of
fact or law that slaves have not a mental or a moral capacity to make
the election to be free .... "208 Ruffin understood the difference
between legal capacity and mental ability.0 9 So he was more willing
to accept the freedom of choice than were courts in other states.210
One of Ruffin's most revealing discussions concerning slavery
came in the obscure of 1845 case Waddill v. Martin,211 which excluded
slaves' property from an estate's claim. 2 Waddill posed the problem
of whether an executor had to collect the property owned by slaves to
satisfy debts against an estate; the executor had not collected the
property and a co-executor charged that he should have."' Ruffin
thought that appropriate, for several reasons. First, no one had
previously collected "the little crops of cotton, corn, potatoes, ground
peas and the like, made by slaves by permission of their deceased
owners." '14 Second, it was desirable to allow the slaves to keep such
little property.
[A]n executor is not bound to strip a poor negro of the things
his master gave him, nor to take away his petty profits from a
patch, with the proceeds of which the slave, with the ordinary
precaution of a prudent and humane master, may be induced,
and in a measure compelled, to buy those needful comforts of
food and raiment, over and above the allowances of the owner,
which promote his health, cheerfulness and contentment, and
enhance his value.... [T]hese slight indulgencies are repaid by
the attachment of the slave to the master and his family, by
exerting his industry and honesty, and a spirit to make and save
for the master as well as for himself.
2 15
There was a combination of universal community sentiment and
economy that evoked the rule Ruffin applied.
207. See Kissam v. Edmundson, 36 N.C. (1 Ired. Eq.) 180, 185 (1840) (employing
imagery of the court's ability to "see through").
208. Redding v. Long, 57 N.C. (4 Jones. Eq.) 216, 218 (1858).
209. Id. at 218-19.
210. See, e.g., McConnell v. Hardeman, 15 Ark. 151, 154-56 (1854).
211. 38 N.C. (3 Ired. Eq.) 562 (1845).
212. Id. at 563-64.
213. Id. at 562-64.
214. Id. at 564.
215. Id. at 564-65.
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And then there was one case in which Ruffin upheld-for
procedural reasons-a trust for quasi-freedom. His 1833 opinion in
White v. White2"6 refused to undo a trust of slaves given to a Quaker
meeting that was to keep slaves in quasi-freedom, because the
settlor's heirs who would take the slaves if the trust were struck down
failed to sue within the statute of limitations.217
Ruffin's opinions involving slavery demonstrate his commitment
to a well-ordered and hierarchical society.218 Ruffin's vision left
owners with extraordinary control over the people they owned,
except when the state had an interest in protecting the institution of
slavery from being undermined by individual slave owners. 19 In cases
where individual slave owners might give their slaves too much
freedom, the state had the interest, indeed obligation, to re-establish
control and again impose order.220  Ruffin's opinions here are
particularly valuable because of their extraordinary candor and
clarity. His jurisprudential traits-of order and hierarchy through
common law and statute and of considerations of utility and natural
law-appear in opinions outside of slavery as well.
IV. RUFFIN'S JURISPRUDENCE MORE GENERALLY
In his opinions across the spectrum from railroads and fellow
servant to private property to slavery, Ruffin worked within a
framework established by moral philosophy: respect for precedent,
reasoning by analogy, and reasoning based on understanding of
history and an understanding of "the nature of things" as they are.221
Or, as he wrote in interpreting a statute, "[a]ll the considerations,
then, that can weigh with a court, the just principles for the
interpretation of statutes, the authority of adjudications, and ancient
writers on the law, and a regard to sound policy and good morals,
concur.,222
216. 18 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat.) 260 (1833).
217. Id. at 271. White distinguished between legal title to a slave and moral right. Id.
at 268-69.
218. See supra notes 156-88 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 166-73.
221. Ruffin employed the phrase "nature of things" in twenty-nine opinions, perhaps
most famously in State v. Hoover, 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 500, 503 (1839).
222. Adams v. Turrentine, 30 N.C. (8 Ired.) 147, 162 (1847).
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Ruffin's opinion illustrates the moral philosophy of his era.223 He
reasoned from precedent, 24 and added considerations of expediency
(utility), as informed by his understanding of history.225 He feared
doing anything that would upset or unsettle society or property. He
wrote often of "the nature of things" and was critical of reforms.
Instead, he looked to the impact of rules on "the actual state of
things. "226 Ruffin referred to the pleasurable duty of following
directions from the legislature, but worried that in some instances
judges might be "lost in the mazes of discretion. '227 Discretion was
not merely personal, "whether wild or sober. 2 s Instead, it "must
from the nature of things be confined to the cases for which provision
was before made by law, or for those of a like kind., 229 That is, Ruffin
saw strict boundaries on judges' discretion.
One of Ruffin's most famous opinions, Hoke v. Henderson,230
upheld a sheriff's property right in his office.23' It found the official
223. On the nature of antebellum moral philosophy, see generally MAURICE S. LEE,
SLAVERY, PHILOSOPHY, AND AMERICAN LITERATURE, 1830-1860 (Ross Posnock ed.,
2005).
224. See, e.g., Jackson v. Hampton, 32 N.C. (10 Ired.) 579, 590 (1849) ("The precedents
from time immemorial cannot be safely departed from. I own, indeed, that I think the
precedents right in themselves, and that it would lead to great mischiefs to disregard
them."); see also State v. Ephraim, 19 N.C. (2 Dev. & Bat.) 162, 166-67 (1836) ("It is... a
bold and hazardous assumption in judges, to change and upset settled law, under the
pretext that it was adopted in a state of society to which it was suitable, but that
circumstances have now so varied ... that the rule ... ought therefore to be altered.").
Contra Green v. Cole, 35 N.C. (13 Ired.) 425, 430 (1852).
225. See, e.g., Scroggins v. Scroggins, 14 N.C. (3 Dev.) 535, 540-41 (1832) (refusing
divorce on grounds that it would perpetuate more divorces and thus result in more harm
than it solved).
226. See, e.g., State v. Cesar, 31 N.C. (9 Ired.) 391, 415 (1849) (Ruffin, J., dissenting);
see also State v. Boyce, 32 N.C. (10 Ired.) 536, 541 (1849) (reversing conviction for keeping
a "disorderly house"):
When the law tolerates such merry makings among these people, it must be
expected, in the nature of things, that they will not enter into them with the quiet
and composure which distinguish the gaieties of a refined society, but with
somewhat of that hearty and boisterous gladsomeness and loud laughs which are
usually displayed in rustic life, even where the peasantry are much in advance of
our negroes in the power and habit of restraining the exhibition of a keen sense of
such pleasures.... If slaves would do nothing tending more to the corruption of
their morals or to the annoyance of the whites than seeking the exhilaration of
their simple music and romping dances, they might be set down as an innocent and
happy class.
Id. at 541.
227. Scroggins, 14 N.C. (3 Dev.) at 540.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 1 (1833).
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had a constitutional right to his office, which he had held since 1806.232
The legislature passed an act in 1832 to use an election to fill the
position.233 Hoke, thus, struck down on constitutional grounds an act
of the North Carolina Legislature.234 Ruffin addressed the difference
between legislators and judges: legislators set policy and judges
followed their instructions. That called for great deference to
legislation; judges should only strike down legislation when "the
repugnance between the legislative and the constitutional enactments
[is] clear to the Court. '235 He contrasted the "comparatively humble"
judicial function with legislation, which "ought to embrace a
knowledge" of the interests of society and "a just estimate of their
relative importance to individual happiness and the common weal.,
236
And where legislators would consider the expediency of a measure,
courts had a more limited role-to decide what rules the Constitution
and legislature have laid down and to apply those rules to the parties:
To a Court, the impolicy, the injustice, the unreasonableness,
the severity, the cruelty of a statute by themselves merely, are
and ought to be urged in vain. The judicial function is not
adequate to the application of those principles, and is not
conferred for that purpose.237
Despite that limited scope for review and high burden to declare an
act unconstitutional, Ruffin struck down the legislature's removal of a
sheriff after his appointment. 238 Hoke emphasized the importance of
the protection of property from even taking by the government. "The
people of all countries who have enjoyed the semblance of freedom,
have regarded this and insisted on it as a fundamental principle." '239
Ruffin explored the right of property based on the American
Revolution, as well as from the North Carolina Constitution.
240
Ruffin found that the legislature had in essence taken over the
judicial function of adjudicating cases, by removing the holder of the
office and mandating an election to find a replacement.241 And he
found that the holder of the office, Henderson, had a property right in
231. Id. at 26-28.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 3.
234. Id. at 26-28.
235. Id. at 8.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 6.
238. Id. at 26-28.
239. Id. at 12.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 12-13.
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it. 24 2 While the legislature might abolish the office entirely while
Henderson was performing the office, he could not be removed
arbitrarily. 243 For there were both public and private interests at stake
in his office-the public's interest in having the position performed
well and the private interest in the salary from the office. 244
We see again Ruffin's deference to legislative decisions in
upholding the legislature's right to condemn property for use by a
railroad in his 1837 decision in Raleigh & Gaston Railroad v. Davis.
245
Ruffin placed the right of condemnation at the center of the state's
rights-"universally acknowledged" by "[w]riters upon the laws of
nature and nations ... as a right inherent in society.
246
Condemnation was permitted for a public use, which he defined as
something "of a nature calculated to promote the general welfare" or
''necessary to the common convenience," to which the public will
have access.247 Ruffin did not want to engage in debate over the exact
origin of the right and the theoretical justifications in the
transcendent right of sovereigns. For, "practically ... its existence in
every state is indispensable and incontestable." '248 The legislature had
the power to order condemnation; the judiciary's role was merely to
make sure that just compensation was paid. For he saw no
interference with the great rights of property. And he placed such
confidence in legislators that he thought it unlikely-in fact, he found
it only "with difficulty conceived to be possible"-that they would
take property without providing just compensation.249 Property
rights, Ruffin believed, "have never been more respected than in
[this] country, where it is carried to the extent, perhaps, injurious, of
successfully opposing great political reforms"25 And he concluded
with his confidence in the role of private businesses:
[a]n immense and beneficial revolution [that] has been brought
about in modern times, by engaging individual enterprise,
industry, and economy, in the execution of public works of
internal improvement. The general management has been left
to individuals, whose private interests prompt them to conduct
it beneficially to the public; but it is not entirely confided to
242. Id. at 13, 20.
243. Id. at 26.
244. Id. at 20-21.
245. 19 N.C. (2 Dev. & Bat.) 451 (1837).
246. Id. at 455-56.
247. Id. at 456.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 461.
250. Id. at 463.
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them. From the nature of their undertaking and the character
of the work, they are under sufficient responsibilities to insure
the construction and preservation of the work, which is the
great object of the government. The public interest and control
are neither destroyed nor suspended.251
Because it was a constitutional opinion-and one on which there was
little constraining precedent-we can see Ruffin's world of deference
to the legislature and his belief in the market to provide economic
progress.252
On rare occasions, Ruffin might wield treatises to support the
theory underlying a point of law; however, he matched theoretical
discussions with practical experience. He was skeptical of areas in
which reasonable minds might differ-places where law and morality
did not admit of a ready answer. Thus, in rejecting a claim for
divorce, Ruffin thought judges particularly lost "when the subject is
one upon which it is known that specialists and moralists have much
disputed, differing as to the policy of divorces and their influence
upon the parties themselves, during their union, and after their
separation., 253 And this concern for divergent opinions led to further
skepticism of natural law as a basis for relief. For he questioned those
rights in Raleigh and Gaston Railroad by observing that
251. Id. at 469.
252. One might even test the various hypotheses about the connections of slavery to
capitalism through Ruffin's opinions. The debate about the relationship between
capitalism and antislavery sentiments starts from the understanding that as capitalism
advanced, so did antislavery sentiment. One explanation is that as people became more
understanding of their connections to others through the market, they also became more
sympathetic to the plights of others. See Thomas Haskell, Capitalism and the Origins of
the Humanitarian Responsibility, in THE ANTISLAVERY DEBATE: CAPITALISM AND
ABOLITIONISM AS A PROBLEM IN HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 107, 107 (Thomas
Bender ed., 1992). Haskell's positive view of capitalism runs counter to, perhaps, the
majority of sentiment unleashed through capitalism. That is, while antislavery sentiment
grew along side the market, so did sentiments regarding workers that were not particularly
solicitous of their well-being. Ruffin's opinions disclose a broad liberalism-each person
bears her own costs-alongside a focus on certain aspects of the public good at the
expense of private rights. See, e.g., Heathcock v. Pennington, 33 N.C. (11 Ired.) 640, 646
(1850); Parham v. Blackwelder, 30 N.C. (8 Ired.) 446, 450 (1848); Mayho v. Sears, 25 N.C.
(3 Ired.) 224, 228 (1842). See generally Redmond v. Coffin, 17 N.C. (2 Dev. Eq.) 437
(1833) (holding the executor liable for the value of slaves freed by an illegal trust);
Scroggins v. Scroggins, 14 N.C. (3 Dev.) 535 (1832) (refusing to grant a divorce). Ruffin's
slavery jurisprudence highlights the connections of the market's emphasis on profit, makes
individuals bear their own losses, and promotes public order over individual rights. While
capitalism may have led some to develop humanitarian sentiments, it led others (and
perhaps the majority) to an increasing individualism. There is, thus, a question of
historical interpretation about the market and proslavery thought. That problem was cut
short, obviously, by the Civil War.
253. Scroggins, 14 N.C. (3 Dev.) at 540-41.
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the sense of right and wrong varies so much in different
individuals, and the principles of what is called natural justice
are so uncertain, that they cannot be referred to as a sure
standard of constitutional power. It is to the Constitution itself
we must look, then, and not merely to its supposed general
complexion.254
Besides cases where corporations' and individuals' property
rights clashed, Ruffin dealt with the interest of families and the state.
Divorce implicated many of the same issues-of utility, of the
balancing of individuals' rights and the state's considerations-that
appeared in slavery cases. In fact, Scroggins v. Scroggins,255 where
Ruffin denied a request for a divorce,256 parallels State v. Mann in
many ways. He quite simply (and coldly, as Stowe would say), tells
people to bear their burden and learn to like it. 257 Scroggins-where
a husband sought divorce when it became apparent that his wife's
child was part African American 21'-presents an important parallel to
Mann in that it takes the world as it is and expects individuals to bear
a burden so that overall a better result emerges. For in Scroggins,
Ruffin denies a divorce on the grounds that if divorces become too
easy to obtain, that will undermine marriage and affect society more
generally:
If the consequence of dissolving the union entirely stopped with
those parties, and conferred on them peace instead of the pain
they suffered, it were but cruelty not to unloose the chain. But
the knowledge that when this last stage of distress arrived, it
would of itself bring relief, would precipitate its approach.
Slight differences would grow into lasting dissentions, and a
single act of unfaithfulness could easily be converted into
habitual adultery. These evils are, in a great measure, avoided
by the principle of our law, which declares the marriage
contract to make a perfect union between the parties .... 2 59
For Ruffin reasoned,
We reconcile ourselves to what is inevitable. Experience finds
pain more tolerable than it was expected to be, and habit makes
even fetters light. Exertion, when known to be useless, is
254. Raleigh & Gaston R.R., 19 N.C. (2 Dev. & Bat.) at 459-60.
255. 14 N.C. (3 Dev.) 535 (1832).
256. Scroggins, 14 N.C. (3 Dev.) at 547.
257. Id. at 545-47
258. Id. at 539.
259. Id. at 541. But the Court allowed, in the same term, divorce for interracial
marriage. See Barden v. Barden, 14 N.C. (3 Dev.) 548, 550 (1832).
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unassayed, though the struggle might be violent if by possibility
it could be successful.... Our restless dispositions and
capricious tastes and tempers require these checks and
restraints. Why shall they be removed? Why give way to those
very propensities in our nature, which it is in our interest to
repress? Is it not wiser, better, kinder to the parties themselves
and their issue to declare the engagement to be unsusceptible of
modification . . . ?260
Economic growth-known at the time as improvement-was
critical to his world view; he opposed change on the basis of its likely
effect on expectations or the economy. At other times, he wrote of
the legislature's attempts to promote economic growth. He was, it
seems, more conservative on alteration of the common law than some
other judges. Concerns with individualism and property rights were
central to his thinking.
Ruffin noted in Morrison v. Connelly,261 the second case he
decided as a justice, the limited role for judges to take account of
changes in circumstances in adapting the law.262 Morrison dealt with
conflicting claims to land.2 63 Regarding the statute of limitations for
adverse possession, Ruffin observed that
[a] century ago the period of seven years was probably wisely
fixed on. The state of the country required that titles should be
settled by a short possession; and wild lands being abundant,
not much was lost to the true owner. But things have since
much altered. And it is likely that the conviction of that led the
Courts to create the doctrine of color of title, with the view of
rendering the statute less effectual and injurious. It is to be
doubted whether the remedy is not the greater of the two
evils.26
260. Scroggins, 14 N.C. (3 Dev.) at 542. Ruffin concluded with an invitation to the
legislature to give further guidance:
The full discussion thus entered into has been deemed due to the legislature and
the court itself, that the principles which will guide the Court may be plainly
known. It is proper that they should be placed before the legislature, that if
thought wrong by them, the Court may be spared from running further into error
by having an authoritative guide to future action in a rule prescribed definitely by
the legislature itself.
Id. at 547.
261. 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 233 (1829).
262. Morrison, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) at 237-39.
263. Id. at 238.
264. Id. (emphasis added).
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In Tate v. Conner,265 Ruffin relied on basic equity principles:
[E]quity itself respects time when the trust is not express,
because it is difficult to ascertain the truth of old transactions,
and therefore parties capable of acting shall not be allowed to
impose that difficulty upon courts; and because acquiescence
for a long period, according to the ordinary experience of the
actions of mankind, raises a presumption of performance or
satisfaction.... The party who wishes to repel the effect of
time must furnish the means of doing [so] .266
In many cases, Ruffin looked to practicalities to cut off further
claims:
[t]ime is evidence, from acquiescence in the exercise by another
of an adverse right, of the grant of that right. But it is further
respected upon a principle of public policy, as a bar to the
investigation of that right, because the truth cannot be
discovered.... Transactions of that period are seen by two
uncertain and obscure a twilight to be sufficiently clear for
judicial action.267
Several opinions on mills illustrate Ruffin's deference to the
legislature, as well as subordination of private rights to public rights
(at least when there was adequate compensation). Eason v. Perkins268
denied an injunction when a neighbor claimed that a mill in existence
for decades had created a private nuisance (by throwing off "vapours
destructive"). 269  Ruffin permitted only an injunction for a private
nuisance when there was "a clear right long previously enjoyed" or if
there would be "irreparable mischief, which makes immediate action
a duty founded on imperious necessity.""27 In Eason, however, there
was only "a single individual to weigh against public utility.""2
Moreover, the legislature had authorized the construction of mills
unless the mill created a public nuisance.272
In 1836 in Pugh v. Wheeler,273 Ruffin upheld the right of
upstream mill owners to preserve their right to use water,
265. 17 N.C. (2 Dev. Eq.) 224 (1832).
266. Tate, 17 N.C. (2 Dev. Eq.) at 226.
267. Villines v. Norfleet, 17 N.C. (2 Dev. Eq.) 167, 172-73 (1831) (emphasis added).
268. 17 N.C. (2 Dev. Eq.) 38 (1831).
269. Eason, 17 N.C (2 Dev. Eq.) at 41.
270. Id. at 40.
271. Id. at 41.
272. 17 N.C. (2 Dev. Eq.) 38 (1831).
273. 19 N.C. (2 Dev. & Bat.) 50 (1836).
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independent of previous, adverse uses by downstream owners.274 He,
thus, entered the contentious area of water rights and concluded that
prior owners could not preempt the rights of subsequent users.27 For
it was a "clear doctrine of the common law" that the owners of
property through which water flowed "may apply it to the purposes of
profit. ,
276
Next, in Adams v. Turrentine,77 Ruffin interpreted the liability
of a jailor to a creditor for allowing a debtor to escape from prison.278
In the face of an argument that English precedents on liability for
allowing prisoners to escape should not be followed because the
United States is less protective of creditors' rights than England,
Ruffin acknowledged that "[t]he world is making an experiment how
far the morals of mankind can be preserved, while persons shall be
exempted from bodily restraint or punishment for such delinquencies.
Our Legislature ... has ... ventured ... on this experiment.
2 79
Ruffin countered that creditors' rights are more important in a
republican government than a monarchy, "for [a republic's] stability
and wholesome operation depend more essentially on the virtue of
the people, and nothing is more speedily or certainly destructive of
private and of public virtue than to relax the obligation of contracts
and render the rights of creditors insecure. ' 280 Further, when Ruffin
overturned a capital conviction based on improper jury deliberations,
he concluded:
One of the duties of Judges is to hand down the deposit of the
law as they have received it, without addition, diminution or
change. It is a duty the faithful performance of which is
exceedingly difficult. They must refrain from all tempting
novelties, listen to no suggestion of expediency, give in to no
plausible theories, and submit to be deemed old-fashioned and
bigoted formalists, when all around are running on in the
supposed career of liberal improvement.... A pause is thus
created for thought amid the hurry of action. Stability is given
to the public institutions, and, above all, there is that recurrence
274. Pugh, 19 N.C. (2 Dev. & Bat.) at 54-56.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 54.
277. 30 N.C. (8 Ired.) 147 (1847).
278. Id. at 149-553.
279. Id. at 157.
280. Id.
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to fundamental principles which is enjoined in our Constitution
and is essential for the preservation of liberty and order.281
Some sense of Ruffin's world or order and hierarchy, while also
promoting economic growth, appears in contrast with the
jurisprudential world of just a generation before. Spencer Roane-
Ruffin's maternal cousin-emerged from an Enlightenment tradition
that aspired to end slavery and that interpreted property law to end
vestiges of feudalism. 2  Southern jurists expressed concern for slaves.
281. State v. Miller, 18 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat.) 500, 526 (1836). As Ruffin wrote in
discussion of a bond:
It was of such consequence, and the rule is likely to produce such mischief, that we
have been willing to re-examine it and override it if possible. But that case stands
upon ground that cannot be shaken. It is the gross injustice that is done by the
rule which makes one hesitate, not the doubt of the law.
Justices of Cumberland v. Armstrong, 14 N.C. (3 Dev.) 284, 287 (1831).
In other cases, Ruffin parsed wills and precedents closely, drawing upon cases,
reason, and "slight and verbal" clues. Cooper v. Pridgeon, 17 N.C. (2 Dev. Eq.) 98, 100
(1831). He found in the case of one will, for instance, that granting a legacy to a daughter
"if my said daughter arrive[s] to the age of 18 years" was a somewhat ambiguous devise
that should vest absolutely in the testator's daughter. Id. at 99. Ruffin looked to the
prevailing circumstances to "govern" him and asked, rather matter-of-factly, would a
father intend to disinherit his infant daughter? Id.; see also Beall v. Darden, 39 N.C. (4
Ired. Eq.) 76, 82 (1845) (interpreting executor's obligations in light of "plain justice and
plain policy"); Justice v. Scott, 39 N.C. (4 Ired. Eq.) 108, 114-17 (1845) (distinguishing
deeds and testamentary twists); Green v. Collins, 28 N.C. (6 Ired.) 139, 143-44 (1845)
(construing will as creating a trust with surviving spouse as beneficiary); Cox v. Hogg, 17
N.C. (2 Dev. Eq.) 121, 136-37 (1831) (interpreting a will that disinherited some as vested
immediately in those who were included in the will). He rejected an attempt to establish
what we now call a spend-thrift trust in Mebane v. Mebane:
[By] the use of no terms or art can property be given to a man, or to another for
him, so that he may continue to enjoy it, or derive any benefit from it, as the
interest, or his maintenance thereout or the like, and at the same time defy his
creditors and deny them satisfaction thereout. The thing is impossible.
39 N.C. (4 Ired. Eq.) 131, 136 (1845).
In other instances, Ruffin sought to establish rules for open dealings with creditors
and debtors. See Hawkins v. Alston, 39 N.C. (4 Ired. Eq.) 137, 151 (1845) ("These facts...
raise a conclusive presumption in a mind, at all familiar with real fair dealings among
mankind, that the conveyance was made for the purpose of turning over the debtor's
property without an adequate consideration .... ); Palmer v. Clarke, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.)
354, 357 (1830) (causing a creditor who places a lien on property but does not ask a sheriff
to execute on it to lose priority, Ruffin stated "the law does not encourage all men to try
experiments, how long they may indulge their debtors in safety to themselves, when in so
doing they give them a delusive credit, at the expense of others").
282. See HUEBNER, supra note 67, at 10-39. If anything, Huebner may underestimate
Roane's intellectual connections to the Enlightenment, as is illustrated in his dissent in
Pleasants v. Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call.) 319, 340 (1800) (Huebner, J., dissenting) (questioning
whether the doctrine of perpetuities can be applied to "cases in which human liberty is
challenged").
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In an earlier era, they had even embraced enlightenment ideas of
freedom. For example, St. George Tucker had taken steps to make
emancipation easier and proposed a gradual abolition plan.283
Ruffin's sentiments were more in keeping with Chancellor Harper of
South Carolina-and other moral philosophers like Thomas Dew,
Albert Taylor Bledsoe, George Frederick Holmes, and William
Gilmore Simms-though he wrote before all of them.284
Even in Ruffin's own place and time, there were alternative
visions of slavery. A colleague and friend on the North Carolina
Supreme Court, William A. Gaston, spoke against slavery in a speech
at the University of North Carolina in 1832.285 Gaston told the
students:
Disguise the truth as we may, and throw the blame where we
will, it is Slavery which, more than any other cause, keeps us
back in the career of improvement. It stifles industry and
represses enterprise-it is fatal to economy and providence-it
discourages skill-impairs our strength as a community, and
poisons morals at the fountain head. How this evil is to be
283. See Miller, 18 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat.) 507-08 ("It is obvious, upon a slight
acquaintance with the history of the law, that there has been, in different ages, a great
difference in the degree of strictness practiced towards jurors."); Michael Kent Curtis, St.
George Tucker and the Legacy of Slavery, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1157, 1164-71 (2006).
284. Charles Elliott's SINFULNESS OF AMERICAN SLAVERY, supra note 59, at 32,
quoted extensively from WHITEMARSH B. SEABROOK, AN ESSAY ON THE
MANAGEMENT OF SLAVES, AND ESPECIALLY, ON THEIR RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION,
READ BEFORE THE AGRICULTURAL SOCIETY OF ST. JOHN'S COLLOTON (Charleston,
S.C., A.E. Miller 1834). Seabrook employed an argument similar to Ruffin's-the
authority of the master must be absolute in the nature of things:
As slavery exists in South-Carolina, the actions of the citizen should rigidly
conform to that state of things. If abstract opinions of the rights of man are
allowed in any instance to modify the police system of a plantation, the authority
of the master, and the value of his estate, will he as certainly impaired, as that the
peace of the blacks themselves will be injuriously affected. Whoever believes
slavery to be immoral or illegal, and, under that belief, frames a code of laws for
the government of his people, is practically an enemy to the State.
SEABROOK, supra, at 6.
Ruffin fits with the context of his education at Princeton in the late eighteenth
century and of Whig thought in the early nineteenth century. See E. BROOKS HOLIFIELD,
THE GENTLEMAN THEOLOGIANS: AMERICAN THEOLOGY IN SOUTHERN CULTURE
1795-1860, at 118-19 (1978); BRUCE KUKLICK, CHURCHMAN AND PHILOSOPHERS:
FROM JONATHAN EDWARDS TO JOHN DEWEY 69-72 (1985).
285. For a transcript of the speech, see WILLIAM GASTON, ADDRESS DELIVERED
BEFORE THE PHILANTHROPIC AND DIALECTIC SOCIETIES AT CHAPEL HILL, June 20,
1832, at 14 (Raleigh, N.C., Jos. Gales & Son 1832).
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encountered, how subdued, is indeed a difficult and delicate
enquiry . 286
Gaston had, moreover, advised at least one client how to use a
trust to free slaves by will.287 Ruffin was even further from other
members of the generation before him, like George Wythe, who
employed a language of republicanism as well as of freedom.288
Where others might see some dissonance in talk of freedom and of
the practice of slavery in the Revolutionary era, by Ruffin's time it
was well accepted that slavery was part of the promotion of
"freedom" among white Southerners.
289
For a fuller picture of that moral philosophy we can turn to
Ruffin's contemporary William and Mary President Thomas
Roderick Dew, who wrote a widely read defense of slavery in the
early 1830s. 29° Other treatises like Thomas Cobb's An Inquiry into the
286. Id. Hinton Helper commented of Gaston's address in The Impending Crisis of the
South which he evidently had not seen, that Gaston "was an avowed abolitionist." Helper
went on to ask:
Where is that address? Has it been suppressed by the oligarchy? The fact that
slaveholders have, from time to time, made strenuous efforts to expunge the
sentiments of freedom which now adorn the works of nobler men than the noble
Gaston, may, perhaps, fully account for the oblivious state into which his patriotic
address seems to have fallen.
HINTON ROWAN HELPER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS OF THE SOUTH: HOW TO MEET IT
225 (New York, A.B. Burdick 1860). A subsequent edition quoted Gaston's speech and
an 1830 oration by North Carolina lawyer Benjamin Swaim. See HINTON ROWAN
HELPER, COMPENDIUM OF THE IMPENDING CRISIS 108 (New York, A.B. Burdick 1860).
Representative Thomas Clingman of North Carolina spoke in favor of Gaston on
December 20, 1847.
287. In Green v. Lane, 43 N.C. (8 Ired. Eq.) 70 (1851), Ruffin struck down an
attempted quasi-emancipation. Id. at 70, 78. Judge (then lawyer) Gaston had counseled
the testator on how to emancipate his slaves; however, the testator subsequently altered
the will to change from an out-of-state emancipation (which would have been valid) to an
invalid form of quasi-slavery. Id. at 75-76.
288. Wythe Holt, George Wythe: Early Modern Judge, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1009, 1025-38
(2007).
289. See, e.g., Abel Upshur, Domestic Slavery, 5 S. LITERARY MESSENGER 667, 678-79
(1839).
290. See Thomas R. Dew, Professor Dew on Slavery, in THE PRO-SLAVERY
ARGUMENT, AS MAINTAINED BY THE MOST DISTINGUISHED WRITERS OF THE
SOUTHERN STATES 287, 287 (Philadelphia, Lippincott, Grambo, & Co. 1853) (reprinting
Dew's review of the debate in the Virginia Legislature, 1831-1832). For a description of
the key tenets of antebellum moral philosophy, see generally JASPER ADAMS, ELEMENTS
OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY (Cambridge, Folsom, Wells, & Thurston 1837); DANIEL
WALKER HOWE, THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE AMERICAN WHIGS 9, 16, 28-29, 32
(1979); WILSON SMITH, PROFESSORS AND PUBLIC ETHICS: STUDIES OF NORTHERN
MORAL PHILOSOPHERS BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (1956). For the leading works in moral
philosophy in the old south, see generally ALBERT TAYLOR BLEDSOE, AN ESSAY ON
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Law of Negro Slavery in the United States link moral philosophy with
judicial action.291
To summarize, the core elements of Ruffin's philosophy were a
commitment to take the world as it is, a natural rights view of
property, and liberalism.2" His opinions give us some sense of why
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1856); JOHN LEADLEY
DAGG, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL SCIENCE (New York, Sheldon & Co. 1860) (1859);
R.H. RIVERS, ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY (Nashville, Tenn., S. Methodist Publ'g
House 1860); WILLIAM A. SMITH, LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY AND PRACTICE OF
SLAVERY AS EXHIBITED IN THE UNITED STATES: WITH THE DUTIES OF MASTERS TO
SLAVES (Nashville, Tenn., Stevenson & Evans 1850). Francis Wayland's college text
maintained its popularity despite Wayland's growing antislavery sentiments. FRANCIS
WAYLAND, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL SCIENCE (Boston, Gould & Lincoln 1862) (1835);
see also Alfred L. Brophy, Considering William and Mary's History with Slavery: The Case
of President Thomas R. Dew, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1091-1139 (2008) (discussing
Dew's intellectual contributions to proslavery thought).
291. THOMAS R.R. COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE
UNITED STATES clxix-clxxiii (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1858).
292. We can use Ruffin to test historians' theories about how law functioned. Primary
among the paradigms is Morton Horwitz's theory that there emerged an instrumental
conception of law, in which judges self-consciously remade law to promote economic
growth. HORWITZ, supra note 64, at 9-32. There are important historical parallels to
those arguments, including William Goodell's American Slave Code in Theory and
Practice, which presents a detailed critique of the way that slave law had emerged to
promote the interests of slave owners. See WILLIAM GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE
CODE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: ITS DISTINCTIVE FEATURES SHOWN BY ITS
STATUTES, JUDICIAL DECISIONS, AND ILLUSTRATIVE FACTS 287-89,353-89 (New York,
Negro Universities Press 1968) (1853). One finds, indeed, some important parallels
between how Goodell and proslavery treatise authors, like Thomas R.R. Cobb, view the
evolution and goals of slave law. See COBB, supra note 291, passim.
Horwitz's picture of slavery is focused largely on the northeast and, therefore,
may have a somewhat different application in the south. Wythe Holt, Morton Horwitz
and the Transformation of American Legal History, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 663, 678
(1982) ("Most of Horwitz's research into changing legal doctrine demonstrates that the
new rules attempted to favor.., capitalist growth-oriented interests by altering traditional
notions of liability so as apparently to reallocate much of the cost of enterprise to others
.... .); Stanley, supra note 64, at 1127-28, 1130 (discussing Horwitz's limited use of cases
involving slavery, but at the same time pointing out that Horwitz relies on a number of
southern cases and its relevance to subsequent research on "the problem of reconciling a
new order of capitalist commodity relations with an older order in which social relations of
dominion and subordination were the rule rather than the exception").
Other accounts include MILLER, supra note 66, at 99-206 (emphasizing both
intellectual elegance of law and its connections to romanticism). Recently, William Fisher,
joined by historians of Jacksonian America more generally, emphasized political ideology
as a way of explaining differences in reasoning style of judges. See William W. Fisher,
Ideology, Religion, and the Constitutional Protection of Private Property: 1760-1860, 39
EMORY L. J. 65, 71-75 (1990). Similarly, G. Edward White has interpreted one kind of
ideology-republicanism-as central to the Marshall Court. 3-4 G. EDWARD WHITE,
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE MARSHALL COURT
AND CULTURAL CHANGE 1815-1835, at 11-75 (1988). See generally Stephen A. Siegel,
The Marshall Court and Republicanism, 67 TEX. L. REV. 903 (1988) (discussing White's
vision of republicanism).
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such a man could think as he did: he thought in terms of a moral
philosophy that emphasized separation of considerations of individual
humanity from larger considerations of duty to law and of
considerations of utility to the society as a whole. Those values were
central to political and legal discussions. And the dominant moral
philosophy of the 1800s concluded that slavery was sanctioned by
long-term use in history and by present necessity. Senator John Bell
of Tennessee, who ran for President in 1860, said during a debate
over the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 that the "three millions of the
African race, whose labor is subject to the will of masters," could not
be freed, even if their owners wished it, without "destruction alike to
the interests and welfare of both master and slave.
293
V. JUDICIAL OPINIONS AS MONUMENTS
The antebellum era was replete with monuments. For example,
there are the Bunker Hill Monument, the Washington Monument,
and much talk of funeral monuments294 at cemeteries throughout the
A jurisprudential-biographical sketch of Ruffin permits us to see how all of those
considerations fit together. We can see someone concerned with the transition to a
market economy, amidst technological and moral progression. Ruffin does not quite fit
any of those models. However, he is interested in deference to legislatures, in taking the
world as it is. He understood that he would be viewed as "old fashioned" but he embraced
that. State v. Miller, 18 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat.) 500, 526 (1836).
This Article, then, is part of an emerging synthesis of antebellum legal thought
that emphasizes the ways that the common law is rooted in tradition, especially respect for
property rights and accepting of the distribution of wealth and power, while
accommodating the expanding market economy and the needs of the community.
293. CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. App. 1106 (Aug. 14, 1850).
294. See, e.g., Cleland v. Waters, 19 Ga. 35, 54 (1855); Fink v. Fink, 12 La. Ann. 301,
301, 306 (1857); Succession of Franklin, 7 La. Ann. 395, 440 (1852); Lund v. Lund, 41 N.H.
355, 358-59, 362-63 (1860); Tuttle v. Robinson, 33 N.H. 104, 117 (1856); Meeker v.
Boylan, 28 N.J.L. 274, 350 (1860) (noting that the first item of testator's will is an order "to
erect a suitable monument to my memory"); Burr's Ex'rs v. Smith, 7 Vt. 241, 241 (1835).
Monuments on the land defined its boundaries. See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 43 Me. 590, 597-
98 (1857) ("[I]f parties, after the conveyance, erect monuments, the monuments control
the description."); Kellogg v. Smith, 61 Mass. (1 Cush.) 375, 376-78 (1851); Icehour v.
Rives, 32 N.C. (10 Ired.) 256, 256 (1849); Literacy Fund v. Clark, 31 N.C. (9 Ired.) 58, 59
(1848) ("[T]he mathematical calls in a deed must give way to those for visible objects
capable of being identified; as, for example, marked trees, and, with yet more reason,
natural boundaries, as they are called, such as rivers or other streams, mountains, rocks, or
other enduring monuments."); Adams v. Turrentine, 30 N.C. (8 Ired.) 147, 157 (1847)
("The statute now under consideration is, on the contrary, an honorable monument to the
purpose of sustaining the modes derived from our forefathers of enforcing the satisfaction
of recoveries by judgment."). Of course, monuments might be odious to equality, for they
might preserve wealth and prestige. See Warner & Roy v. Beers, 23 Wend. 103, 128-29
(N.Y. 1840). Still, monuments were important, for memories might fade. Cutts v. King, 5
Me. 482, 487 (1829).
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country.295 The monuments Judge Thomas Ruffin left us are his
judicial opinions. So Ruffin's jurisprudential legacy is part of what we
remember when we name a building after him. Part of the calculation
of what we are to make of a building named after him requires us to
assess how we view Ruffin.
At the time, jurists understood the opinions as landmarks.
Timothy Walker told a graduating class at the Cincinnati College's
Law School of the changes in law at the time: "Questions are now
agitated, which may shake its deepest foundations .... Well tried
opinions are paling before new lights. Vested rights are trembling
before false doctrines. Ancient landmarks are swept away by the
rushing torrent of innovation." '296 Some parts of the federal law,
reformers wrote at the time, are so well entrenched that they "have
become landmarks of property, and cannot be disturbed."297 Or, as
Justice Johnson wrote in Green v. Biddle,29 "I am groping my way
through a labyrinth, trying to lay hold of sensible objects to guide
me. 
2 99
In a tribute to Justice Lemuel Shaw of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, one justice spoke of Shaw's fame:
His fame will not be evanescent. The enduring monuments of
his judicial learning, his intellectual grasp, his sound judgment,
and his unceasing labor, will be found in the published reports
of the judicial decisions of this court. To these he will be found
to have contributed to an amount much beyond any one of his
associates, far more than his illustrious predecessors, Parsons
and Parker.... [O]ur late venerable chief has had the singular
fortune of a judicial life protracted to thirty years, continuing in
his full vigor of mind and entire capacity for the duties of his
office; and the results of his labors are to be found in forty nine
already published volumes, to which will soon be added seven
more to complete the series.3"0
295. See, e.g., JOSEPH STORY, AN ADDRESS DELIVERED ON THE DEDICATION OF
THE CEMETERY AT MOUNT AUBURN, SEPTEMBER 24, 1831 (Cambridge, Joseph T. &
Edward Buckingham 1831).
296. Timothy Walker, Advice to Law Students, 1 W.L.J. 481,482 (1844).
297. Bosley v. Wright, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 390, 397 (1853).
298. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823).
299. Id. at 101. Other cases spoke of judicial opinions as monuments as well. See, e.g.,
Pollard's Heirs v. Kibbe, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 353, 415 (1840) ("Whether that case, standing
solitary and alone, shall stand in its glory or its ruins, a judicial monument, or a warning
beacon, is not dependent on any opinion.... ").
300. In re Opinion of the Justices, 81 Mass. 599, 600-01 (1861).
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The Missouri Supreme Court wrote of Blackstone's Commentaries as
monuments in the1834 slavery case, Marguerite v. Chouteau:3 10
Mr. Justice Blackstone ... tells us that the monuments and
evidences of the legal customs of England are contained in the
Records of the several Courts of Justice, in books of reports
and judicial decisions, and in the treaties of the learned sages of
the profession, preserved and handed down to us from the
highest antiquity. 2
At other times, lawyers used monuments to slavery as evidence of
slavery's validity and ubiquity:
If it be one of those just and moral precepts and injunctions,
which are discoverable by the light of reason, that no man may
make his fellow-being his slave, it is one of those precepts, or
injunctions, which every man, and every community, have
interpreted and applied for themselves. Whatever the precept
may be, by whomsoever, and wheresoever pronounced, it has
always encountered the fact, that mankind have always been
divided into masters and slaves. Whatever changes the world
and society have undergone in other respects, thus far it has
undergone none in this; excepting in some few communities,
where slavery has ceased. This lamented Africa, to which we
are now called upon to make retribution on claims, which have
been accumulating for ages, if she was the first, in time, in arts,
in science, and refinement (which may well be doubted), was
also the first to show the division of mankind into master and
slave. The monuments of northern Africa, which have survived
all history and tradition, prove nothing so distinctly as their own
antiquity, and that they were raised by the toil of slaves. The
same distinction is found among Jews and Gentiles; among
Greeks, and barbarians; among Romans, and strangers.3 3
Judicial opinions, in short, served as intellectual monuments for the
future.3°4
301. 3 Mo. 540 (1834).
302. Id. at 560 (internal citation omitted) (citing page sixty-three of the first volume of
his commentaries).
303. U.S. v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 836 (C.C. Mass. 1822) (No. 15551).
304. See Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 133, 140 (1795) (writing of monuments,
"progress of inconceivable difficulty, settled in the dominions of the Emperor of China,
who hospitably received them, and erected a monument on the spot, to commemorate the
event. Col. Mag. for Feb. 1788."); Warner v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 95, 103
(1817) ("There is little reason to doubt, but that in all civilized States, some written
monument is preserved of all their important Officers, whether Judicial, Executive, or
Ecclesiastical. But that the case is so, cannot be Judicially known to a Foreign Court
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Precedent formed intellectual monuments-but there were also
physical monuments. The Ruffin monuments-in judicial opinions
and in stone on the face of Ruffin Hall-represent the separation of
law from politics. He is remembered outside of the context of law as
an ancient, venerable man-if he is remembered at all.3"5  Dean
Roscoe Pound included Ruffin on his list of the best judges in
American history in his 1938 book The Formative Era of American
Law, and later Ruffin appeared in Bernard Schwartz's Main Currents
in America's Legal Thought.306 He is remembered in law as an expert
legal mind. Ruffin may have also been antislavery in private, if we
believe Stowe's characterization.3 7 Indeed, given how important
State v. Mann is in exposing the system of slavery, we might think of
him as an antislavery judge who undermined slavery with what
appears to be a proslavery opinion. Such has often been said about
Justice Joseph Story's opinion in Prigg v. Pennsylvania.3 °s Story's
opinion there was perhaps slightly more plausibly antislavery,
because it limited states' power to support slavery even as it upheld
the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.301 Nevertheless, as Barbara Holden-
Smith has effectively shown, there is little reason to think Story was
antislavery.310
Nevertheless, we owe Ruffin a great deal for having made the
abolitionists' case easier and quite probably, for contributing to
jurisprudence as well.31' Not only did opinions like State v. Mann
provide the substantive evidence of the inhumanity of slavery but
they also taught lessons about the sources of law and the moral
without proof. Much less can it be known, or assumed, that these monuments are open to,
or that authenticated copies thereof can be had by, a stranger ... ").
305. In a sketch that a lawyer prepared of Judge Ruffin--commenting on Ruffin's birth
in Virginia-he wrote that "Napoleon was born in Corsica, but France, the scene of his
glory, always claimed him as her son." WHEELER, supra note 1, at 20. Thus, Ruffin was
remembered for his contributions to law, though not for State v. Mann.
306. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 243-
51 (1993) (characterizing Ruffin as judge who wrote in the "grand style").
307. See supra notes 27-41 and accompanying text (discussing Stowe's characterization
of Ruffin in both A KEY TO UNCLE TOM'S CABIN and DRED: A TALE OF THE GREAT
DISMAL SWAMP).
308. James Boyd White, Constructing a Constitution: "Original Intention" in The Slave
Cases, 47 MD. L. REV. 239, 263 (1992).
309. Id.
310. See generally Paul Finkelman, Sorting Out Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 24 RUTGERS L.
J. 605 (1993) (characterizing the decision as proslavery); Barbara Holden-Smith, Lords of
Loom, Lash, & Law: Justice Story, Slave, and Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 78 CORNELL L. REV.
1086, 1091 (1993) ("Story's antislavery reputation is seriously overblown.").
311. For when William Goodell wrote The American Slave Code in Theory and
Practice in 1853, he drew frequently upon reported cases. GOODELL, supra note 61, at 90-
92 (relying upon cases to depict slaves' lack of property rights).
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calculations judges employed. They conveyed the pragmatic
considerations that laid the groundwork for post-war critique of law.
One looking for the intellectual antecedents of Holmes's pragmatism
or Llewellyn's realism might find it in the vibrant antislavery writings
of Goodell, Theodore Dwight Weld's American Slavery As It Is,312
and in proslavery legal thought as well.313 There is much to be
debated about where realism came from; it is at least plausible that it
derives from Holmes, who in turn descended from the
Transcendentalists and abolitionists who studied the slave law and its
correlation with Southern culture.314  Some have characterized
formalism as the successor to abolitionist thought, which in one strain
retreated to a mechanistic interpretation of the Constitution.315
However, we see in antislavery literature an engagement with the
ways that slave law reflected attitudes-and how the slave law related
to how the slave system worked.
There were, to be sure, people who saw inhumanity in the slave
code. William Goodell wondered how
the wise legislator, civilian, or jurist, [could] not see and
condemn, in the Slave code, the opprobrium of legislation, the
312. THEODORE DWIGHT WELD, AMERICAN SLAVERY AS IT IS: A TESTIMONY OF A
THOUSAND WITNESSES (New York, American Anti-Slavery Society 1839).
313. See, e.g., COBB, supra note 291, at clxix-clxxiii (describing the abolition of slavery
in the United States); GEORGE S. SAWYER, SOUTHERN INSTITUTES: OR, AN INQUIRY
INTO THE ORIGIN AND EARLY PREVALENCE OF SLAVERY AND THE SLAVE TRADE 293-
332 (Philadelphia, J. Lippincott 1859); Alfred L. Brophy, Utility, History, and the Rule of
Law: The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 in Antebellum Jurisprudence, in TRANSFORMATIONS
IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MORTON J. HORWITZ 109, 113-
22 (Alfred L. Brophy & Daniel W. Hamilton eds., 2009). One might also tie those
treatises together with religious proslavery works, such as HOWELL COBB, A SCRIPTURAL
EXAMINATION OF THE INSTITUTION OF SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES, WITH ITS
OBJECTS AND PURPOSES (Books for Libraries Press 1972) (1856); WILLIAM HAMILTON,
THE DUTIES OF MASTERS AND SLAVES, RESPECTIVELY: OR DOMESTIC SERVITUDE AS
SANCTIONED BY THE BIBLE (Mobile, Ala., F.A. Brooks 1845); JOSIAH PRIEST, BIBLE
DEFENSE OF SLAVERY; AND THE ORIGINS, FORTUNES, AND HISTORY OF THE NEGRO
RACE (Scholarly Press 1951) (1853); and JAMES HENLEY THORNWELL, RIGHTS AND
DUTIES OF MASTERS: A SERMON PREACHED ON THE DEDICATION OF A CHURCH
ERECTED IN CHARLESTON FOR THE BENEFIT AND INSTRUCTION OF THE COLOURED
POPULATION (Charleston, S.C., Walker & James 1850).
314. On the origins of realism, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960, at 109-43, 169-92 (1992). We perhaps ought to be hearing
more about the antislavery origins of legal realism, which can be seen in works like
Goodell.
315. See generally William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement Upon
Judicial Styles of Reasoning, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1974) (analyzing the effect of the
antislavery movement on judicial decision making).
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disgrace of jurisprudence, the subversion of equity, the
promotion of lawlessness, the element of social insecurity, and
the seeds of every crime which legislation and jurisprudence
should suppress or restrain.316
That brings us to a series of questions about monuments and to the
issue of honoring Mr. Justice Thomas Ruffin himself. Sanford
Levinson provocatively addressed the problems with a building
named after Ruffin in 1996.317 He boldly asked, "[w]ould ... we wish
to honor him by placing his portrait in American law schools as a
presumed inspiration to future generations of law students as to what
it means to be a 'distinguished' lawyer or judge?" '318 Levinson
thought that there should be nothing named after Ruffin in any law
school in the country.319
Similar issues of memory crop up frequently in discussions of
Civil War memory.32 ° First, should each generation be bound by the
naming decisions of past generations? One of Ruffin's
contemporaries, Ralph Waldo Emerson, like Thomas Jefferson a
generation before, suggested that each new generation ought to make
sense of this past for themselves.321 Such were common beliefs among
antebellum Americans. In his 1837 address, The American Scholar,
Emerson asked for a break from past precedents: "Each age, it is
found, must write its own books .... The books of an older period
will not fit this. 312 2 Yet at other times, Emerson acknowledged the
importance of names:
316. GOODELL, supra note 57, at 405, 407.
317. Sanford Levinson, Allocating Honor and Acting Honorably: Some Reflections
Provoked by the Cardozo Conference on Slavery, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1969 (1996).
318. Id. at 1969. At the time Levinson was writing, Harvard had recently taken down
its portrait of Roger Taney, author of the Dred Scott decision. See Rosalind S.
Helderman, Dealing with Sins of the Forefathers: Md. Torn over Statues of Justice in Dred
Scott Case, WASH. POST, July 23, 2007, at B1.
319. See generally Levinson, supra note 317.
320. See, e.g., SLAVERY AND PUBLIC HISTORY: THE TOUGH STUFF OF AMERICAN
MEMORY 1-35 (James Horton & Lois Horton eds., 2006). See generally Sally Greene,
State v. Mann Exhumed, 87 N.C. L. REV. 701 (2009) (characterizing State v. Mann as "part
of a broader pattern" of thought indicative "of an increasingly defensive slaveholding
elite"). And the questions of memory continue to appear in discussions of racial politics
today. For instance, the movement for reparations revolves in large part around how we
view the ways our past is connected to our present. Is the United States a place of
opportunity or oppression? See generally ALFRED L. BROPHY, REPARATIONS PRO AND
CON (2006) (discussing the major arguments of both sides of the reparations debate).
321. 1 RALPH WALDO EMERSON, The American Scholar, in NATURE, ADDRESSES,
AND LECTURES 52, 56 (Alfred R. Ferguson ed., 1971).
322. Id.
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The system of property and law goes back for its origin to
barbarous and sacred times; it is the fruit of the same
mysterious cause as the mineral or animal world. There is a
natural sentiment and prepossession in favor of age, of
ancestors, of barbarous and aboriginal usages, which is a
homage to this element of necessity and divinity which is in
them. The respect for the old names of places, of mountains
and streams, is universal. The Indian and barbarous name can
never be supplanted without loss.32 3
At other times, Emerson spoke of the value of property and the
system of precedent. And while Emerson may have been skeptical of
those values himself, he catalogs their importance to Americans
generally. 24 Tradition is an important value, so we cannot remove
names without a loss.
Other issues to consider include the meaning of a monument to
the people who erected it, who had a say in naming or placing the
monument, and what is the meaning of the monument today? The
arguments for keeping names include:
(1) Tradition. We have called a building by this name all
along, and it is improper to go back and rewrite names now.325
(2) Revision is a political act of cultural destruction or
erasure of memory. We are engaged with similar questions
now in Iraq, where we ask whether we should remove
monuments erected by Saddam Hussein.326
(3) Removal is divisive.
(4) A name is morally owed as a tribute for past good
deeds. The names were given as a tribute for good deeds and
we should keep them. Sometimes, as in the case of
"Confederate Memorial Hall" at Vanderbilt University, the
name was paid for (or so it appears). 27
323. RALPH WALDO EMERSON, The Conservative, in NATURE, ADDRESSES, AND
LECTURES, supra note 321, at 184, 188-89.
324. Id.
325. Cf. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 616-35 (2001) (suggesting value of
long-term expectations).
326. See Kirk Semple, Iraq Confronts Hussein Legacy Cast in Bronze, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 8, 2007, at 1. For a larger view of these issues of cultural destruction, see generally
ROBERT BEVAN, THE DESTRUCTION OF MEMORY: ARCHITECTURE AT WAR (2006).
327. See United Daughters of the Confederacy v. Vanderbilt Univ., 174 S.W.3d 98, 104
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). "Monument law" appears in many places, such as in cases like
United Daughters of the Confederacy, where the court interpreted a name on a building
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There are competing considerations among the reasons for
preservation or removal of names. In some ways, removal of names
serves the purposes of interests of the powerful: it allows erasure of
past injustices. That forgetting can allow the powerful to escape
liability for the past. However, one might also keep the name
because it is part of a tradition, and we want to continue to honor that
tradition. Among the "reformers," the impulse to rename (and thus
stop honoring the dishonorable) is counter-balanced by the desire to
keep people from forgetting. Table 1 classifies the purposes served
by removal and by maintenance of monuments.
and returned a park named after the donor to the donor's family when the park was
ordered integrated. It also appears in cases over access to a park such as Evans v. Abney,
396 U.S. 435 (1970), and the display of a monument on public property. See JOHN B.
NEFF, HONORING THE CIVIL WAR DEAD: COMMEMORATION AND THE PROBLEM OF
RECONCILIATION (2005); JIM WEEKS, GETTYSBURG: MEMORY, MARKET, AND AN
AMERICAN SHRINE 116 (2003) (discussing Sickles Act); Ann Bartow, Naming Rights and
the Physical Public Domain, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 919, 953-56 (2007); Mary Johnson,
An "Ever Present Bone of Contention": The Heyward Shepherd Memorial, 56 W. VA.
HIST. 1, 1-26 (1997) (discussing the University of D.C.'s memorial to a "faithful slave,"
Heyward Shepherd, who was the first person killed at Harper's Ferry); Peter Byrne,
Hallowed Ground: The Gettysburg Battlefield in Historic Preservation Law 32 (Dec. 8,
2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/georgetown/fwps/
papers/91 (noting that the Gettysburg Battlefield was seen as recognition of veterans'
contributions in the Civil War). It is related to the important literature on the Antiquities
Act of 1906. See generally Christine Klein, Preserving Monumental Landscapes Under the
Antiquities Act, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1333 (2002) (arguing in favor of setting aside
"monumental landscapes" as antiquities). It is also related to first amendment concerns
surrounding public monuments, see Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686-92 (2005)
(turning to history and context to settle controversy over display of Ten Commandments
on public property), and to just compensation for historic preservation. See generally
SANFORD LEVINSON, WRITTEN IN STONE: PUBLIC MONUMENTS IN CHANGING
SOCIETIES (1998) (addressing the meta-issues of memorials and how the law treats
controversies around them); Charles P. Lord, Stonewalling the Malls: Just Compensation
and Battlefield Protection, 77 VA. L. REV. 1637 (1991) (discussing the costs of preserving
historic sites).
2009] MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND MONUMENTS
Table 1
Motivations and Considerations in Renaming
Remove Keep
Monument Monument
Tradition;Non-Reformers Forgetting Honoring the
Past
Reformers Stop Honoring the Reminding ofDishonorable the Past
The key question becomes the value of the monument to its
proponents: does it still have value as a rallying point? Does it yet
serve a function of memorializing?3 28 And if the monument is still
serving some function, is the removal more about who is in power
now? We see such issues with the statue of Saddam Hussein toppled
in Baghdad in April 2003, and our own country faced this when we
toppled the statue of King George III in New York City in 1777. To
the extent that monument removals are undertaken by the people in
power now, this is just another form of politics. Who can speak for
the community, so that there can be some kind of consensus on what
should be done with the monument? The context of how the
monument was put up and its meaning today define the boundaries of
the debate.329
328. Phrased in other ways: Does the monument serve the same function it did when it
was put up? What conflicts were present when it was put up? Who participated in the
naming decision? Is there a continuing obligation-such as arises when there is payment
of money for naming-or was the naming gratuitous? Are private parties trying to dictate
terms to the public? And at some point we need to realize this is a political decision. That
means there ought to be some sense of the cost of removing or of keeping a name. So, will
the costs of removal outweigh the benefits?
329. Some sense of the meaning emerges from Walter Clark's work. See WALTER
CLARK, Thomas Ruffin, in 4 GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS: THE LIVES AND INFLUENCE
OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS WHO HAVE ACQUIRED PERMANENT NATIONAL
REPUTATION, AND HAVE DEVELOPED THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES:
A HISTORY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA 279, 279 (William Draper Lewis
ed., 1908) [hereinafter GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS]; Walter Clark, Chief Justice of
North Carolina, Address Delivered in the Hall of the House of Representatives (Feb. 1,
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Perhaps Ruffin was believed to be great because of his honesty in
Mann, which was of great assistance to the abolitionists. North
Carolina Supreme Court Chief Justice Walter Clark-a progressive
late nineteenth and early twentieth century jurist-did not mention
this honesty in his extensive article on Ruffin in the multi-volume
series Great American Lawyers published between 1907 and 1909.
Chief Justice Clark concluded with typical praise: "[H]e is [thought]
by much [sic] the greatest judge who has ever sat upon the bench in
North Carolina. Should any one be found who may deny him this
honor, he will admit at least that Ruffin has had no superior.""33 The
absurdly laudatory entries in Great American Lawyers are themselves
ripe for historical examination. What, for instance, do they say about
the deference accorded judges in public and the self-congratulatory
treatments of lawyers in the early twentieth century? But until we
have that analysis, it may suffice to note that Ruffin's opinions are
praised in general terms, not for their recognition of slave law, but for
more general qualities. What were those qualities? James Willard
Hurst included Ruffin as one of a handful of antebellum judges who
deserve praise in The Growth of American Law: The Lawmakers:
"Generally what has made men 'great' in our law has been that they
saw better where the times led and took their less imaginative, less
flexible, or less courageous brethren in that direction faster and with a
minimum of waste and suffering.""33 But those qualities are vague, at
best. "One difficulty," Hurst acknowledged, "in appraising the
quality of the bench in the United States was the lack of agreement,
or even of any considerable thought, on the qualities which made a
good judge.... Asked to specify wherein lay the greatness, ...
opinion faltered and took refuge in vague generalities from the
moralists." '332  So, first, in memorializing Ruffin, we may be
(inadvertently) memorializing his contribution to the antislavery
cause; or, at least, we may be memorializing qualities other than those
for which we criticize him today. The process of forgetting (and
denial) may have taken such a course already by the early twentieth
1915) in ADDRESSES AT THE UNVEILING AND PRESENTATION OF THE STATE OF THE
STATUE OF THOMAS RUFFIN 7-23 (1915). Decisions about placement of monuments or
buildings are political decisions as Ruffin himself recognized in a case involving the
relocation of courthouses. See State v. Jones, 23 N.C. (1 Ired.) 414, 414-16 (1841). They
are "matters of political arrangement and expediency, and necessarily the subjects of
legislative discretion." Id. at 415.
330. CLARK, GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS, supra note 329, at 297.
331. JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAWMAKERS
18 (1950).
332. Id. at 141.
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century that Ruffin's connections to slavery (or maybe even
antislavery) were forgotten.
Advocates of judicial restraint, such as Justice Hugo Black,333
would have held Walter Clark in high esteem for Clark's opinions
such as Abbott v. Beddingfield,334 in which Clark noted:
Whatever tends to increase the power of the judiciary over the
legislature diminishes the control of the people over their
government, negatives the free expression of their will, is in
conflict with the spirit and the express letter of the organic law,
and opposed to the manifest movement of the age.335
Black-and others-might also appreciate Ruffin's sense of the
need for humility among judges in Hoke v. Henderson,336 which seems
to have been a precursor of Clark's ideas, for Clark cited it in Abbott:
Neither the reasons which determined the will of the people on
the one hand, nor the will of the representatives on the other,
can be permitted to influence the mind of the Judge .... His
task is the humbler and easier one of instituting a naked
comparison between what the representatives of the people
have done, with what the people themselves have said they
might do, or should not do ...
We had an example of this in Spring 2007, when Yale University
announced it would take down the portrait of its namesake Elihu
Yale, which depicted him being waited on by an enslaved child. (The
boy has a tell-tale metal color, which seems to indicate a slave-
although it may indicate he is an East Indian servant.) The reason the
university did this was-in the words of one of its vice-presidents-
that it was misleading, for Elihu Yale did not actually own people.338
Thus, it was removed not because it was a monument to the era of
white supremacy, but because it was wrongfully implicated Yale. The
333. See generally Howard Ball, HUGO L. BLACK: COLD STEEL WARRIOR (2006)
(detailing Justice Hugo Black's key role in implementing the doctrine of judicial restraint).
334. 125 N.C. 256, 34 S.E. 412 (1899).
335. Id. at 291, 34 S.E. at 422-23.
336. 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 1 (1833), overruled in part by Mial v. Ellington, 134 N.C. 131, 46
S.E. 961 (1903).
337. Id. at 8. Of course, that humility might be more believable if Ruffin had not
declared the legislature's act unconstitutional (and in a case where he was far, far ahead of
his time in protecting a property right in a government office).
338. Kim Martineau, Yale Portrait Coming Down; Painting Suggests Link to Slavery,
HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 8,2007, at Al.
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portrait33 9 is nowhere to be found on their website; in fact, it's not
easily found anywhere on the internet. Ah, the era of forgetting is
upon us.
A somewhat different version of this manufactured forgetfulness
was practiced by the University of Virginia in 2007, when its Board of
Visitors (its trustees) hastily, and without public discussion, issued an
apology for the University's connections to slavery.34° In many ways,
the apology was a positive step forward, taken in the wake of the
Virginia legislature's apology for slavery. However, the University,
thus, missed a chance to have a serious discussion about the
University's culpability in extending the institution of slavery and the
benefits the University received. The apology happened and then it
could be forgotten.
Perhaps-indeed probably-more destructive than the campus
buildings named after people like Ruffin are the books left to us by
historians who are defenders of the South.3 41 Thus, we have J. G. de
Roulhac Hamilton's Reconstruction in North Carolina, Claude
Bower's The Tragic Era (a book I purchased as a high school student
at a book sale and read), Avery 0. Craven's The Coming of Civil
War, William Archibald Dunning's Reconstruction, Political and
Economic, U. B. Philips' American Negro Slavery, and Allen
Johnson's 1921 article in the Yale Law Journal on "The
Constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Acts," which rehabilitated
antebellum Southern thinking on the Act.342
J. G. de Roulhac Hamilton headed the history department at the
University of North Carolina from 1908 to 1931. 343 And, of course, as
339. Id.
340. See Press Release, University of Virginia's Board of Visitors Passes Resolution
Expressing Regret for Use of Slaves (April 24, 2007), http://www.virginia.edu/uvatoday/
newsRelease.php?id=1933.
341. See Catherine W. Bishir, Landmarks of Power: Building a Southern Past in
Raleigh and Wilmington, North Carolina, 1885-1915, in WHERE THESE MEMORIES
GROW: HISTORY, MEMORY AND SOUTHERN IDENTITY 139, 139-68 (W. Fitzhugh
Brundage ed., 2000).
342. CLAUDE G. BOWERS, THE TRAGIC ERA: THE REVOLUTION AFTER LINCOLN
(1929); AVERY CRAVEN, THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR (The Univ. of Chicago Press
1957) (1942); JOSEPH G. DE ROULHAC HAMILTON, RECONSTRUCTION IN NORTH
CAROLINA (Books for Libraries Press 1971) (1914); WILLIAM ARCHIBALD DUNNING,
RECONSTRUCTION, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC: 1865-1877 (Harper Bros. 1962) (1907);
ULRICH BONNELL PHILIPS, AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY: A SURVEY OF THE SUPPLY,
EMPLOYMENT AND CONTROL OF NEGRO LABOR AS DETERMINED BY THE PLANTATION
REGIME (D. Appleton & Co. 1966) (1908); Allen Johnson, The Constitutionality of the
Fugitive Slave Acts, 31 YALE L.J. 161 (1921).
343. Documenting the American South, Joseph Gregoire de Roulhac Hamilton, 1878-
1961, www.docsouth.unc.edu/nc/hamilton/bio.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2009).
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followers of Southern history know, he also founded the Southern
Historical Collection at the University of North Carolina, one of the
greatest collections of Southern, even American, history available
anywhere.344 So, we realize how complex the world is-and how even
events started as exercises of ancestor-worship can, over time, change
character. One only need think of Drew Faust's use of the Senator
James Henry Hammond's papers at the University of South
Carolina's archives to understand the way that tools contained in the
archives can be used to construct a new history of slavery.345 Yet, we
may, indeed, be talking about the wrong building. Perhaps we should
be renaming the history department's building from Hamilton Hall. I
might suggest a more appropriate name is Beale Hall, after the
University of North Carolina history professor who left the university
because his view was too controversial-and, we might add now,
correct.346
What, then, we may ask is the value of remembering Ruffin?
Ruffin poses the problem of how we are to think about someone who
is a part of a system of evil. As Eric Muller has pointed out,
historians are often not ideally equipped to make moral judgments.
3 47
Our task is more frequently to contextualize and understand than to
make moral decisions. There are multiple ways to view Ruffin, if we
are to hazard a moral judgment. Of course, he was a supporter of
slavery. There is little evidence that he voted to free enslaved people.
The few instances when he found in favor of freedom were when the
person was de facto free already.348 Moreover, Ruffin's clarity of
thought made it possible to critique the proslavery legal system.
Beginning with Theodore Weld's American Slavery As It IS,
3 49
running to William Goodell's American Slave Code in Theory and
Practice,35° and to Stowe's A Key To Uncle Tom's Cabin,35'
abolitionists mined Ruffin's opinion, along with other proslavery
opinions, to critique and undo the system of slave law. In fact, Ruffin
344. See W. FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE, THE SOUTHERN PAST: A CLASH OF RACE AND
MEMORY 105 (2005).
345. See DREW FAUST, JAMES HENRY HAMMOND AND THE OLD SOUTH: A DESIGN
FOR MASTERY passim (1982).
346. See Howard K. Beale, On Rewriting Reconstruction History, 45 AM. HIST. REV.
807, 807-27 (1940).
347. Eric L. Muller, Fixing a Hole: How the Criminal Law Can Bolster Reparations
Theory, 47 B.C. L. REV. 659, 659 (2006).
348. See Thompson v. Newlin, 43 N.C. (8 Ired. Eq.) 32, 37-38, 50-51 (1851).
349. WELD, supra note 312.
350. GOODELL, supra note 57.
351. STOWE, supra note 15.
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may-by exposing the system-have done more to undermine it than
many abolitionists.
CONCLUSION
Monuments are so often created in a politically charged
atmosphere. It is hard to give much weight to a name imposed as part
of a political motive. The intellectual monuments that Chief Justice
Thomas Ruffin left to us continue in existence; they are in the North
Carolina Reports. And, much like other intellectual monuments-
Thomas Dixon's novel, The Clansman,352 D.W. Griffith's Birth of A
Nation,353 and Chief Justice Roger B. Taney's opinion Dred Scott v.
Sandford,354 for instance they cannot be erased, only repudiated.
Ideas in books are there forever; they must be overcome by our daily
labors. And in this, we face a challenge that is more difficult and
more important, than a simple change of a name. For these implicate
such decisions as the value of precedent, money, respect for the past,
statement of our current beliefs, and continuing statements about past
beliefs so one may respect Thomas Ruffin's mind and be thankful for
his honesty. We ought, as historians, to look deeply at his ideas, for
what he can teach us about that very different world that he
inhabited. However, in naming a building after him, we say there is
something to hold up about him that is, well, worth remembering.
And in talking about this, we learn about his world and ours.
352. THOMAS DIXON, JR., THE CLANSMAN: AN HISTORICAL ROMANCE OF THE KU
KLUX KLAN (1905).
353. BIRTH OF A NATION (Griffith Feature Films 1915).
354. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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